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I. INTRODUCTION
Under a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause, the signatories of a treaty
agree to accord each other the same treatment they grant to any other nation.
The MFN principle of non-discrimination is ubiquitous in contemporary
international economic relations. It has long been considered "the corner-stone
of all modem commercial treaties,"' and it remains at the heart of the
contemporary international trade system as Article 1 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The MFN principle has also been
used in other fields of international relations, such as consular relations. In the
second half of the twentieth century, it was incorporated into the emerging
field of international investment law, where it is has become a "core element
of international investment agreements" 2 and is included in most of the more
than two thousand bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that comprise the field.3
However, two features of international investment law have presented
particular difficulties in the application of the MFN principle. First, whereas
international trade law is now embodied in multilateral treaties, attempts to
establish a broad multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) have failed.*
Thus, rather than convergence toward a single MFN clause applicable to all,
analogous to GATT Article 1, international investment law presents a
multiplicity of differently worded MFN clauses embedded in different treaties,
with the result that the MFN clauses are subject to a broad range of
interpretations. Second, the relationships between these varied MFN clauses
and dispute settlement mechanisms have presented a unique set of problems.
Dispute settlement is central to the functioning of international investment
law,5 yet the multitude of BITs contain varying provisions about when, how,
and in which forum investors can bring claims against host states. This
diversity of provisions concerning dispute settlement fits uneasily with the
MFN principle, which requires that all investors be treated equally, and recent
arbitrations conducted under the auspices of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have reached sharply divergent
results on the question of whether an MFN clause entitles an investor to
invoke the dispute settlement provisions of a third party's treaty with the host
state.
The issue has arisen tangentially in a number of recent arbitrations, but it6
was of central importance in five cases. These five decisions are divided: in
1. Stanley K. Hornbeck, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause (pt. 1), 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 395, 395
(1909) (internal quotations omitted).
2. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment, 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10(Vol. I1) (1999), available at http://www.unctad.org/
enldocs/psiteiitdl0v3.en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment].
3. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 65 (1995).
See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Quantitative Data on Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/
WebFlyer.asp?intltemlD=3150&lang=l.
4. For a review of efforts to establish an MAI, see Riyaz Dattu, Essay, A Journey from
Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275 (2000).
5. See infra Subsection III.B. 1.
6. The five decisions are: Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 396 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
three cases, Maffezini, Siemens, and Gas Natural, the tribunals upheld the
claimants' invocation of third-party dispute settlement provisions via MFN
clauses. In the other two cases, Salini and Plama, the tribunals rejected such
invocation. Despite the apparent incompatibility of these decisions, and
notwithstanding the insistence by the tribunal in Plama on a difference of
principle with the Maffezini line of cases,7 this Article argues that these five
cases were all, in fact, correctly decided-although not necessarily for the
reasons given by the tribunals. The different outcomes are explained by
fundamental differences in the text of the treaties in question and the
circumstances in which the MFN question arose.
It will be tempting for future tribunals to see these decisions as
representing two incompatible lines of cases and thus to choose sides, as it
were, between Maffezini and Plama. This article argues instead that these
decisions can be reconciled and that tribunals would be ill advised to look to
these decisions as embodying a presumptive rule to guide future cases.
Instead, future tribunals should be careful to interpret each treaty on its own
terms and with reference to the specific circumstances in which the claim
arises. However, although each dispute must be resolved on a case-by-case
basis, the specific provisions and circumstances at issue must be interpreted
against a clear understanding of the overall purpose of the international
investment law system and the specific aims and functions of dispute
settlement and MFN provisions in this field. Such an understanding will tend
to favor giving a broad scope to MFN clauses that are not expressly or
implicitly limited, but it will also direct the attention of tribunals toward
certain factors that will push in the opposite direction in individual cases.
The existing jurisprudence not only lacks coherence and clarity, it also
contains much that is incorrect, misleading, and potentially dangerous. The
result is that the case law has created more interpretive problems than it has
solved. Nevertheless, and perhaps paradoxically, the outcome in each case, at
least on the MFN issue, is correct. This Article aims to clear a path through
this tangled case law, to show how these cases could be both properly
grounded and deprived of potentially mischievous consequences.
Based on a close analysis of the existing case law, this Article argues
against a general presumption that the scope of an MFN clause should be
construed either broadly or narrowly. However, it does draw several specific
conclusions and interpretive recommendations for the future. First, this Article
argues that an MFN clause cannot be made to substitute for a state's consent
emilio DecisiononJurisdiction.pdf; Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction (2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision-en.pdf; Salini Costruttori
S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44 I.L.M. 573 (2005), available
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/salini-decision.pdf, Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44 I.L.M. 721 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/plama-decision.pdf, Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision
of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction (2005), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/
GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf.
7. See Plama, para. 223, 44 I.L.M. at 755. ("[T]he principle with multiple exceptions as
stated by the tribunal in the Maffezini case should instead be a different principle with one, single
exception: an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute settlement
provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty
leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.").
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to jurisdiction, either to gain access to arbitration in the first instance or to
gain access to what might be perceived as a more favorable arbitral forum.
Second, where consent exists, ordinary rules of treaty interpretation should
apply rather than the sort of presumptions hinted at in Maffezini and expressly
advocated in Plama and Gas Natural. Third, dispute settlement mechanisms
should be viewed as a package and should not be mixed and matched. As
Siemens illustrates, this can lead to an anomalous situation in which a state is
required to grant every claimant a more favorable set of provisions than those
to which it has actually consented in any treaty. Fourth, to invoke provisions
of a third-party treaty, a claimant must show that its provisions are not only
different but also objectively "more favorable" to claimants generally. Fifth, it
remains unusual for a BIT to specify whether the MFN clause applies to
dispute settlement, 8 yet in light of the confused state of current law, states
negotiating bilateral investment treaties would be well advised to follow the
example of either the United Kingdom or the United States and provide a
clear indication of their intent on this question. Following these
recommendations, and avoiding the errors highlighted in this Article, should
lead to a more coherent approach to MFN issues.
The Article is structured as follows. Part II reviews the historical
evolution of MFN clauses in the trade context and their introduction into
investment treaties in the second half of the twentieth century. Part III places
the debate over the interpretation of the MFN clause in the broader context of
the aims and purposes of international investment law as a whole and the
MFN clause and dispute settlement provisions in particular. Part IV analyzes
the relevant precedents in the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.). Part V critically scrutinizes the recent investment arbitrations
that have addressed the relationship between MFN clauses and dispute
settlement provisions. Part VI draws together a number of conclusions and
recommendations aimed at clarifying several key issues and bringing future
practice into greater harmony with the policy aims animating the field of
international investment law.
II. THE MFN CLAUSE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
International investment law is a product of the twentieth century;
however, the MFN clause has been a part of international economic relations
for centuries. While the MFN clause serves a similar non-discrimination
purpose in both the trade and investment contexts, the practical circumstances
giving rise to MFN concerns are quite different. In importing the MFN
8. To date, the United Kingdom is the only state with a consistent practice of addressing the
issue explicitly by inserting a provision clarifying that the MFN clause does apply to dispute settlement.
The United States has been less explicit, but its practice has been to use MFN clauses limited in scope to
treatment "with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation,
and sale or other disposition of investments." North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
art. 1103, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 639 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. In addition, as the Plama
tribunal discusses, see infra Part V.G., the United States insisted on the inclusion of a footnote in the
draft Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (F.T.A.A.) to the effect that the Maffezini interpretation
could not apply to the MFN clause in the FTAA-a clause identical to the one in the NAFTA. The U.S.
view is thus sufficiently clear.
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principle from the trade context, international investment law has also
imported the historical baggage of how MFN clauses have been understood
and applied in the trade context over hundreds of years. This history thus
plays a central role in how MFN clauses are interpreted today.
Most-favored-nation clauses have been traced back as far as the eleventh
century. 9 Medieval trading cities sought monopolies in the exploitation of
foreign markets, but when monopoly could not be achieved, MFN
arrangements were the next best alternative, assuring the merchants of the
Italian, French, and Spanish trading cities that they would have "opportunities
at least equal to those of their rivals."' 10 For example, in 1226, Frederick II
granted to citizens of Marseille the same privileges he had previously granted
to citizens of Pisa and Genoa." In the Middle Ages, however, international
commerce "was really carried on by the adventurous few, and was, as a rule,
either sporadic or governed by monopolies."' 12 It was not until after the
expansion of international commerce itself over the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries that the clause became widespread. The phrase "most-favored-
nation" made its first appearance at the end of the seventeenth century.' 
3
Powerful states often secured unilateral pledges of MFN treatment from
less powerful states. For example, a 1692 treaty between Portugal and
England guaranteed MFN treatment to British subjects only. 14 Such one-sided
arrangements typically benefited European powers without reciprocal benefits
for their non-European counterparts and were "a constant feature of the
capitulations."' 15 In the capitulations system, whenever one of the European
powers managed to extract a new concession from the state subject to
capitulations, that concession would be immediately extended to all of the
other powers who held MFN privileges. For example, when Russia defeated
the Ottoman Empire in 1774 and extracted commercial privileges in a
subsequent treaty, the treaty became the basis of much of the Ottoman
Empire's foreign economic relations. 16 The unilateral MFN clause thus
served, in effect, to magnify the strength of the European powers and the
weakness of the states subject to capitulations.
A dispute arose between China and Belgium in 1926 when China sought
to terminate its one-sided treaty with Belgium. Belgium sought to bring the
case before the Permanent Court, but the Chinese refused to participate and
instead issued a public statement:
9. Endre Ustor, First Report on the Most-Favoured Nation Clause, [1969] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 157, 159, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/213.
10. Id.
11. See Hornbeck, supra note 1, at 398-99.
12. Id. at 399.
13. Id. at 395, 400 (noting that the phrase appears in a 1692 treaty between Denmark and the
Hanse cities); see also Ustor, supra note 9, at 160 ("The modem form of the clause evolved in the
eighteenth century, when the phrase 'most favored foreign nation' also appeared.").
14. See Ustor, supra note 9, at 160 (discussing and quoting from that document); see also
Hornbeck, supra note 1, at 400 (giving the date of the treaty as 1642).
15. Ustor, supra note 9, at 161; see also Suzanne Basdevant, La Clause de la Nation la Plus
Favorise: Effets en Droit International PrivY, reprinted in LA CLAUSE DE LA NATION LA PLUS
FAVORIStE 8 (Librairie du Recueil Sirey (Soci&t6 Anonyme)) (1929). ("La clause de ]a nation la plus
favorisee est le fond de toutes les capitulations.").
16. Ustor, supra note 9, at 16 1.
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The 'unequal treaties' which were exacted from China nearly a century ago have
established between Chinese and foreigners discriminations that are now sources of
endless discontent and friction with foreign Powers. Such a state of affairs is not as it
should be, since intercourse between nations, as between individuals, finds its rational
motif in the exchange of mutual benefits which will endure and lead to lasting friendship.
In an age which has witnessed the coming into existence of the League of Nations ...
there does not seem to be any valid reason to justify international relations which are not
founded on equality and mutuality.'
7
This system of capitulations forms the backdrop of the Anglo-Iranian Oil case,
discussed in detail in Part IV.A, infra.
A. Conditionality and Reciprocity
While the unilateral form of the clause has fallen out of favor as being
incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of states, another form
of the clause has fallen into disuse because it simply proved unworkable.'
8
The "conditional" MFN clause, and the conditional interpretation of MFN
clauses generally, are primarily associated with U.S. practice from the 1770s
through to the 1920s, although the conditional clause was briefly prevalent in
Europe as well in the middle of the nineteenth century. 19 The clause was
conditional in the sense that, when an economic concession was granted in
exchange for some compensation from the other side-whether such
compensation was simple reciprocity or some other form of compensation-
the state benefiting from the MFN clause could only secure the concession by
granting the same compensation.
The conditional clause had a logical grounding in the principle of
reciprocity. 2° The idea was that each privilege or concession granted by, for
example, the United States was bargained for and paid for with a
corresponding concession on the other side. The American view was
succinctly expressed by Secretary of State John Sherman in 1898:
[T]he allowance of the same privileges .. . to a nation which makes no compensation,
that have been conceded to another nation for compensation, instead of maintaining
destroys that equality ... which 'the most-favored-nation clause' was intended to secure.
It concedes for nothing to one friendly nation what the other gets only for a price.
21
The MFN clause was thus not a means by which a state could get something
for nothing, but rather a promise that the terms of any deal would be equally
available to any country with an MFN clause. As one commentator put it, the
17. Statement of the Chinese Government, 1929 P.C.1.J. (ser. C) No. 16-I, at 271 (Nov. 6),
quoted in Ustor, supra note 9, at 167.
18. For a general critique of the conditional clause, see RICHARD SNYDER, THE MOST-
FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE: AN ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO RECENT TREATY PRACTICE
AND TARIFFS 211-22 (1948).
19. Stanley K. Hornbeck, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause (pt. 2), 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 619,
620-21 (1909).
20. See Hombeck, supra note 1, at 406.
21. Letter from Secretary of State John Sherman to William I. Buchanan (Jan. 11, 1898), in 5
MOORE'S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (1906), quoted in Hornbeck, supra note 1, at 408.
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conditional clause is thus the equivalent, in practice, of having no MFN clause
whatsoever.
22
The reciprocal logic of the conditional clause, with its emphasis on
bargaining for special favors and concessions, was well-suited to a
protectionist commercial policy. Mutually advantageous concessions could be
worked out on a bilateral basis, but high tariff barriers could be retained
against any state unwilling or unable to pay for their reduction with an
identical concession. In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, tariff
policies in Europe underwent a transformation and protectionist policies were
gradually abandoned. The key event in this transformation was the 1860
Cobden Treaty, under which the two leading powers, France and Great
Britain, lowered tariffs across the board and granted one another
unconditional most-favored-nation status.23 The unconditional MFN clause
was seen as a useful instrument for dismantling the protectionist tariff system,
since a single breach in the tariff wall would destroy it, at least for those
countries benefiting from unconditional MFN clauses. Even when Europe
returned to protectionism later in the nineteenth century, the unconditional
clause remained in favor. 24 The practices of Japan and Latin American
countries had tended to vary between the European and the American
approaches, in part as a function of the treaty partner.
25
The United States, however, maintained its insistence on the conditional
MFN clause until after World War I, when it jettisoned both protectionism
and conditionality in favor of free trade and unconditional MFN treatment-at
least insofar as U.S. exports were concerned.26 In 1924 Secretary of State
Hughes urged the Senate to ratify the new treaty with Germany implementing
this change in policy:
It was the interest and fundamental aim of this country to secure equality of treatment but
the conditional most-favored-nation clause was not in fact productive of equality of
treatment and could not guarantee it. Moreover, the ascertaining of what might constitute
equivalent compensation in the application of the conditional most-favored-nation
principle was found to be difficult or impracticable .... Under present conditions, the
expanding foreign commerce of the United States needs a guarantee of equality of
treatment which cannot be furmished by the conditional form of the most-favored-nation
clause.
27
Thus, in light of the changed position of the United States in the world
economy, the conditional clause had ceased to be useful. As the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the MFN clause put it:
22. Boris Nolde, La Clause de la Nation La Plus Favoris4e et les Tarifs Preffrentiels, 39
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 91 (1932).
23. Hornbeck, supra note 19, at 623.
24. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 212. There were, nevertheless, European advocates of the
American-style conditional clause in this period. See, e.g., Julius Wolf, Foreword to DIE
MEISTBEGONSTIGUNGS-KLAUSEL, at v (Lorenz Glier ed., 1905). See generally DIE
MEISTBEGONSTIGUNGS-KLAUSEL (Lorenz Glier ed., 1905).
25. Hornbeck, supra note 19, at 625-26.
26. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 197 (discussing the U.S. policy of demanding unconditional
MFN treatment in treaties while simultaneously maintaining high tariff barriers).
27. Change in Favored-Nation Clauses, 5 HACKWORTH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §502,
at 273 (1942), quoted in Endre Ustor, Fourth Report on the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, [1973] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 97, 98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973.
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The conditional clause served the purposes of the United States so long as it was a net
importer and its primary aim was to protect a growing industrial system. Since the
position of the United States in the world economy changed radically after the war, the
conditional clause proved to be inadequate. The essential condition for a successful
penetration of international markets, i.e. the elimination of discrimination against
American products, could only be achieved through the unconditional clause.
2 8
Once the United States abandoned the conditional clause in the early 1920s,
that form of the clause effectively disappeared from international commercial
29
agreements. One form of the clause, in which MFN treatment is conditioned
on material reciprocity, however, continued to be used in the field of consular
immunities.
30
It has been said that "the most-favored-nation policy adopted by any
nation will depend upon the characteristics of its economy and the type of
trade policy deemed necessary to protect and foster the development of that
economy." 1 The historical division between countries favoring the
conditional form and those favoring the unconditional form is in some ways
analogous to the contemporary disputes about whether MFN clauses in
investment treaties apply to dispute settlement provisions. Past disputes often
concerned the proper interpretation of a treaty which did not clearly state
whether it was conditional or unconditional.3 Hornbeck summarized the
division of views as follows: "Those countries which have had commercial
policies smacking of free trade have shown a preference throughout for the
unconditional, while those countries which have been most consistently
protectionist . .. have favored the conditional. 33 Put another way, in the
context of nineteenth century commercial treaties, those countries who were
net importers of goods favored the most restrictive interpretation of the MFN
clause, whereas net exporters favored the most expansive interpretation.
Analogously, in the context of contemporary investment treaties,
restrictive interpretations of MFN clauses will tend to benefit importers of
capital, whereas expansive interpretations will benefit exporters of capital.
The analogy, however, is imperfect. One peculiarity of the investment law
context is the conflict of interest concerning dispute settlement mechanisms
between the state and its nationals who invest abroad. As the Maffezini case
illustrates, a capital-exporting country will not hesitate to invoke restrictive
interpretations of the MFN clause whenever it finds itself in the role of
respondent. Moreover, the largest capital-exporting country, the United States,
responded to the Maffezini award by insisting on the inclusion of a footnote in
the draft Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (F.T.A.A.) and other post-
28. Ustor, supra note 9, at 163.
29. See id.
30. See Ustor, supra note 27, at 99. It is far from clear, however, what function the MFN
clause serves in such contexts: the aim of the material reciprocity requirement appears to be to establish
a guarantee of equality between the treatment of nationals of country A in country B with the treatment
of nationals of country B in country A, rather than to ensure that there will not be discrimination within
country B between nationals of country A and nationals of other countries.
31. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 242.
32. Ustor, supra note 27, at 101.
33. Hombeck, supra note 19, at 627.
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Maffezini treaties34 indicating that the wording of the MFN clause, modeled
on that of the NAFTA and most U.S. BITs, precluded its applicability to
dispute resolution mechanisms. While the United States may have been more
concerned about procedural predictability than about restricting access to
arbitration for foreign investors,35 the entire episode illustrates how a state's
complex interests do not necessarily map onto those of its investors.
Interestingly, just as the United States has reprised its role as the leading
advocate of a restrictive interpretation of the MFN clause, the United
Kingdom has become the leading advocate of a broad interpretation. The
United Kingdom's model BIT provides expressly that the MFN clause shall
apply to dispute settlement. 3In this case, however, the two countries'
opposite views do not correspond to different economic positions: While both
countries receive significant amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows-indeed the United States is the world's largest recipient of FDI-
these inflows tend to be dwarfed by FDI outflows. The only recent exception
to this trend was in 2004, when the United Kingdom experienced a net inflow
of investment.
37
In any event, most capital-exporting countries are also significant
importers of capital and therefore have interests pushing in both directions.
The limits of structural economic explanations of the positions taken by states
were further illustrated in the case of Mondev International v. United States,
where the NAFTA contracting parties convened while the arbitration was
pending against the United States in order to issue a narrow interpretation of
NAFTA article 1105(1).38 This effort was led not by Mexico, but by the
United States, and illustrates that in the context of international investment
law, the interests of investors and their home states are frequently in conflict.
B. The Free Trade Movement and Efforts at Codification
World War I had disrupted the trading and treaty relationships of the
nineteenth century, and the early years after the war were marked by a
resurgence of mercantilism, including the renunciation of treaties containing
MFN clauses by a number of states. 39 Dissatisfaction with this new
protectionism slowly gave rise to a free trade mood exemplified in the League
34. See, e.g., Draft Investment Chapter of US-Thailand FTA as Proposed by US (2006),
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id-article=4144.
35. There is something of a paradox in the U.S. position on Maffezini, since its policy in
recent BITs has been to incorporate very flexible and expansive provisions concerning access to
arbitration. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 154; see also U.S. Model BIT art. 24 (2004),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf.
36. Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 204, 44 I.L.M. 721, 723 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-
decision.pdf.
37. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the
Internationalization of R&D 303, U.N. Doc. WIR05, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
wir2005annexesen.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, World Investment Report].
38. Mondev Int'l v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, paras. 99-103, 6 ICSID
(W. Bank) 193, 216-18 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
39. See Basdevant, supra note 15, at 10; see also Nolde, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that the
mood at the 1927 Geneva Conference was shaped by frustrations and complications caused by the
abandonment of MFN by a number of countries).
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of Nations' International Economic Conference of 1927. The Conference
concluded that "the mutual grant of unconditional most-favoured-nation
treatment as regards Customs duties and conditions of trading is an essential
condition of the free and healthy development of commerce between States,"
and therefore "strongly recommend[ed] that the scope and form of the most-
favoured-nation clause should be of the widest and most liberal character and
that it should not be weakened or narrowed either by express provisions or by
interpretation." 40 At the same time as the economists recommended a broad
interpretation of the MFN clause, the lawyers on a subcommittee of the
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law
concluded that "it would not seem either necessary or desirable even if it were
practicable to endeavour to frame a code provision to govern the case" and
that the solution to the problems of interpreting MFN clauses were to be found
instead in clear drafting and application of "the ordinary rules of judicial
interpretation." 4 1
The Great Depression dealt a further blow to proponents of free trade,
and the MFN principle did not fully reclaim its central position in
international commerce until after World War II, when it became the
cornerstone of the international trading system as Article 1 of the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The adoption of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding in 1994 means that states can now bring
disputes concerning trade agreements before an international panel that will be
empowered to issue decisions that are binding on the parties. 42 Like the MFN
clause itself, the dispute settlement mechanism is rooted in a multilateral
treaty, but it does not allow for private parties to bring claims in the way that
BITs do. The contemporary questions regarding the applicability of MFN
clauses to investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms have not arisen in the
trade context, because such mechanisms have not ordinarily been included in
trade agreements--or indeed in treaties of any kind.43
C. Growth Through Investment: The Emergence of International
Investment Law After World War H
The field of international investment law emerged in the second half of
the twentieth century as the product of two closely interrelated developments:
the adoption of a dense network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 44
40. Ustor, supra note 9, at 169 (quoting The World Economic Conference: Final Report 34,
League of Nations Doe. C.356.M. 129.1927.11 (C.E.I.46) (1927)).
41. Ustor, supra note 9, at 172 (quoting Report of George Wickersham, League of Nations
Doc. C.205.M.79.1927.V (1927)).
42. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Understanding Concerning the Rules and Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs..e/legal e/28-dsu.pdf. Under the GATT
system, the affected country could block a panel decision against it, whereas consensus is no longer
required under the WTO system.
43. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 119 (noting that investor-state dispute settlement
provisions in BITs are "unusual in treaty practice insofar as [they] afford[] private parties the right to
pursue claims under an international treaty").
44. Some countries refer to BITs as Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPAs) or
Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs).
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
beginning in 1959 and the establishment of an international forum for the
settlement of investor-state disputes through the creation of the World Bank's
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in
1966. The intimate connection between the two developments can be seen in
the following statistic: of 1100 BITs in existence in 1996, over 900 provided
for ICSID arbitration of investor-state disputes. 45 The field grew at a
phenomenal pace, such that by the end of 2004, some 2392 BITs had been
signed, the vast majority of which provide for arbitration under the auspices of
ICSID or another arbitral forum. 46 The proliferation of BITs has been
accompanied by an equally remarkable growth in the volume of FDI flows to
developing countries-and in the number of investor-state arbitrations. In
1992 such flows reached what was then a record $47 billion.47 By 2004, this
amount had increased nearly fivefold to $233 billion.48 Not surprisingly, this
investment activity has generated an increasing number of investor-state
disputes brought before arbitral tribunals under the ICSID Convention.
49
The creation of ICSID and the expanding network of BITs were driven
by the aim of fostering economic development by increasing flows of
international investment. While the explosion of FDI inflows to developing
countries may be primarily attributable to changes in domestic laws,
regulations and economic policies, 50 BITs and the access they provide to
ICSID or other forms of international arbitration have also played an
important role in this growth. 51 Enshrining substantive protections in domestic
law or in a bilateral treaty, however, was not enough to reassure many
potential investors who sought access to a neutral forum for dispute
settlement, a forum whose decisions would be binding on the host state. As
UNCTAD's 2003 report on investor-state dispute settlement put it:
It is evident ... that treatment standards and guarantees are of limited significance unless
they are subject to a dispute-settlement system and, ultimately, to enforcement ...
Indeed, this is a point often made by both foreign investors and host countries. For the
former, the security of foreign investment will turn not only on specified safeguards, but
also on the assurance that these safeguards are available on a non-discriminatory and
timely basis to all foreign investors. Conversely, the host country wishes to ensure that, in
the event of a dispute with foreign investors, it will have the means to resolve the legal
aspects of that dispute expeditiously and taking into account the concerns of the State, as
well as those of foreign investors. 52
45. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Introduction, Bilateral Investment
Treaties 1959-1996, n. I (1996), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm; see also DOLZER &
STEVENS, supra note 3, at 129 ("The overwhelming majority of BITs contain a reference to ICSID.").
46. UNCTAD, World Investment Report, supra note 37, at 24 (noting that of 2392 signed
BITs, approximately thirty percent were still awaiting ratification).
47. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at xi.
48. UNCTAD, World Investment Report, supra note 37, at xix.
49. Emmanuel Gaillard, Chronique des sentences arbitrales, 131 JOURNAL DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 213, 213-14 (2004) (noting the "geometric" progression in the number of ICSID
arbitrations).
50. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at xi.
51. Id. at 12 ("I[T]he legal framework and its positive or negative effect on facilitating a
particular venture and ensuring compensation in the event of an expropriation will no doubt play a role
in the decision of any would-be investor.").
52. UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INVESTOR-STATE 1 (2003), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit30_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT].
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Thus while investors sought access to international arbitration, developing
countries were reticent about subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of
arbitral tribunals that might be more sensitive to the concerns of investors than
to those of states, and they naturally sought to minimize any constraints on
their domestic policy-making autonomy. 3 The ICSID Convention was an
attempt to accommodate both sets of concerns. The Report of the Executive
Directors of the World Bank on the ICSID -Convention emphasized that
"[w]hile the broad objective of the Convention is to encourage a larger flow of
private international investment, the provisions of the Convention maintain a
careful balance between the interests of investors and those of host States."
54
III. THE CHALLENGE OF INTERPRETING MFN CLAUSES IN THE INVESTMENT
LAW CONTEXT
Disputes about the scope and meaning of MFN clauses are as old as the
clause itself. While the historical disputes over interpreting MFN clauses in
the trade context are highly relevant, intemational investment law has given
rise to a set of new and different interpretive challenges.
In 1909, Stanley Horbeck wrote:
Rarely does a conditional provision so extensively used and so vital in its bearing upon
economic relations escape misinterpretation and avoid becoming the source of
misunderstanding. The experience of [the MFN] clause has been no exception to the rule.
All through the diplomatic correspondence of the last century there appear constant
disagreements and ever-recurring irritation over what is the meaning and what are the
obligations attaching to this or that clause.
55
The International Law Commission's effort to bring some clarity to the area
has been largely unsuccessful. The draft articles on MFN clauses that the
Commission proposed in 1978 were never adopted as a convention 56 and
provide little insight into the questions raised in contemporary arbitrations.
Thus the "ever-recurring irritation" continues, and in the field of international
investment law the debate is no longer confined to scholarship and diplomatic
correspondence but takes place primarily in litigation before arbitral tribunals.
Moreover, "contrary to trade, where the MFN standard only applies to
measures at the border, there are many more possibilities to discriminate
against foreign investment." 57 To make matters worse, while the MFN
53. See JEAN-PIERRE LAVIEC, PROTECTION ET PROMOTION DES INVESTISSEMENTS: ETUDE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE 9 (1985) ("En fait, nombre de gouvemements et de 16gislateurs ont
6mis de doutes, et manifest6 des rrticences sur l'opportunit6 de ces traitrs. En fonction des experiences
historiques qu'ils ont subies, des pays ayant 6t6 colonists ont craint que certains de leurs intr&ts
16gitimes ne soient, en definitive, l6srs."); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 8 ("Latin American
countries have had a long-standing tradition of opposition to international rules concerning foreign
investment, whether in the form of customary law or treaty law.").
54. ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965), reprinted in ICSID
CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 35, 41 (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/basicdoc/ICSID-English.pdf [hereinafter ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors].
55. Hombeck, supra note 1, at 395.
56. U. N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, U.N. Doc.
A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A1I978/Add.1
(pt. 2), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1-3-1978.pdf.
57. UNCTAD, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, supra note 2, at 4.
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principle "is a core element of international investment agreements[,]" 58 it has
never been enshrined in a broad, multilateral convention that might have
imposed some consistency in the wording and application of MFN clauses.
5 9
As a result, today each state finds itself at the hub of a dense network of treaty
relationships, all of which are infused with the MFN principle; however, the
principle is embodied in clauses that can vary significantly in terms of their
text and context. 60 Indeed what was said of the MFN clause in trade
agreements prior to the GATT era could be said with equal force regarding the
clause in BITs: "each time the principle of equality of treatment is
incorporated in a commercial treaty a new clause is born." As a result of this
diversity, "there is no such thing as the most-favoured-nation clause: every
treaty requires independent examination."
62
While it is certainly true that "the question of whether an MFN clause
applies to dispute settlement mechanisms is reducible to a question of
interpretation of the treaty of which the investor is a beneficiary[,] '' 63 the
interpretive challenge requires not only an application of the rules of treaty
interpretation, but also a clear understanding of the roles of MFN and dispute
settlement in the investment law context.
A. Treaty Interpretation
The rules of treaty interpretation have been codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, in particular Article 31(1), which
provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose." 64 The International Law Commission
explained that this rule "emphasizes the primacy of the text as the basis for the
interpretation of a treaty, while at the same time giving a certain place to
extrinsic evidence of the intentions of the parties and to the objects and
58. Id. at 1.
59. In fact, it has been argued that the failure of the efforts in the 1990s to negotiate a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the OECD context was an indication that "[t]he
willingness of countries to enter into regional and bilateral investment agreements does not necessarily
signify the unconditional willingness to sign onto a global investment agreement that grants all states,
and all investors of all states, rights vis-a-vis all other potential host states of investments." Dattu, supra
note 4, at 302. If this analysis is correct, it suggests a certain weakness in the commitment to the MFN
principle by at least some states. An additional factor behind the failure of the MAI may be that a
multilateral solution was necessary in the trade context where free rider problems impeded tariff
reductions. Such problems are largely absent from the investment context, where a state's primary
motivation for liberalization is to attract investments rather than to secure more favorable conditions for
its capital exports. See generally SNYDER, supra note 18, at 197, 199-205.
60. See Org. of Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in
International Investment Law 2-3 (Working Paper No. 2004/2, Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085.pdf (noting the diversity of formulation and context of
MFN clauses and providing representative samples).
61. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 5.
62. ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 285 n.1 (1938).
63. Emmanuel Gaillard, Chronique des sentences arbitrales, 132 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 135, 162 (2005) [hereinafter Gaillard 2005] (translation by author).
64. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/II_1969.pdf. [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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purposes of the treaty as means of interpretation." 65 The ILC further clarified
that the arrangement of Article 31 was not to be understood as "laying down a
hierarchical order for the application of the various elements of interpretation
in the article. ' 66 Instead, "All the various elements, as they were present in
any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would
give the legally relevant interpretation." 67 Former President of the I.C.J.
Arnold McNair described the "main task of any tribunal which is asked to
apply or construe or interpret a treaty ... as the duty of giving effect to the
expressed intention of the parties, that is, their intention as expressed in the
words used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances."68
As the recent cases illustrate, however, the text of most MFN clauses
does not provide a clear indication as to whether the parties to the BIT
intended the clause to apply to dispute settlement mechanisms. Thus, tribunals
have relied heavily on considerations of purpose, surrounding circumstances,
and pragmatic considerations, to decide individual cases. The result is a set of
opinions that appear irreconcilable in that they apply sharply divergent
assumptions regarding these background elements. This Article argues that
many of the assumptions made in the recent case law are both unwarranted
and unnecessary, but that a proper understanding of the roles of MFN clauses
and dispute settlement mechanisms in the BIT context may nevertheless
provide some guidance for interpretation.
B. Objects and Purposes
As discussed, supra, the adoption of BITs, together with the
establishment of ICSID, have been motivated by the aim of fostering
economic development through increased flows of international investment.
Dispute settlement provisions and MFN clauses are integral components of
the international investment law system, 69 but the interaction between them is
unclear. UNCTAD's 2003 report on investor-state dispute settlement
suggested a close relationship, 70 and a closer examination of their respective
purposes shows that, in the investment law context, there are strong reasons to
believe that unless an MFN clause is limited by its text, context, or
65. Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 218,
U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1/1966, reprinted in 3 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
38(2001).
66. Id. at 39.
67. Id.
68. ARNOLD DUNCAN McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 365 (1961); cf EMERICH DE VATTEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 246 (Charles Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution ed., 2001) (1758) ("Since the
sole object of a lawful interpretation of the deed ought to be the discovery of the thoughts of the author
or authors of that deed,-whenever we meet with any obscurity in it, we are to consider what probably
were the ideas of those who drew up the deed, and to interpret it accordingly.").
69. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at xii (The four substantive areas usually covered by
BITs are: admission, treatment, expropriation of foreign investment, and the settlement of disputes."),
70. UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 52, at I ("It is evident, however, that
treatment standards and guarantees are of limited significance unless they are subject to a dispute
settlement system and, ultimately, to enforcement. Accordingly, the importance of dispute-settlement
mechanisms for issues between a host State and an investor is readily discernible. Indeed, this is a point
often made by both foreign investors and host countries. For the former, the security of foreign
investment will turn not only on specified safeguards, but also on the assurance that these safeguards are
available on a non-discriminatory and timely basis to all foreign investors.").
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surrounding circumstances, it applies to all treatment of investors, including
dispute settlement.
1. The Fundamental Place of Dispute Settlement in
International Investment Law
The rationale underlying the ICSID Convention was that "[t]he creation
of an institution designed to facilitate the settlement of disputes between
States and foreign investors can be a major step toward promoting an
atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus stimulating a larger flow of private
international capital into those countries which wish to attract it."'71 The same
rationale applies to an agreement in a BIT to refer investment disputes to
ICSID arbitration-indeed the preambles of BITs routinely refer to the
creation of a favorable environment for investment as one of the primary
72
aims. An atmosphere of mutual confidence conducive to investment is one
in which both investors and states are able to plan their affairs with stable
expectations about the future and with confidence that their respective rights
and prerogatives will be protected by the applicable legal system.
Dispute settlement is thus one of the core features of a BIT. The tribunal
in Gas Natural reviewed the history of the ICSID Convention and the
subsequent wave of BITs and concluded that "a crucial element - indeed
perhaps the most crucial element - has been the provision for independent
international arbitration of disputes between investors and host states., 73 At
least from the perspective of investors, "treatment standards and guarantees
are of limited significance unless they are subject to a dispute settlement
system and, ultimately, to enforcement." 74 The value of treaty-based
protections for investors is thus a function not only of the terms of the specific
provisions but also of the quality of the mechanism for enforcing those rights
against the host state. From the host state's perspective, meanwhile,
consenting to arbitration is a concession, a waiver of the state's sovereign
prerogative not to be haled before an international court without its consent.
Thus the state's interests include ensuring that the forum is unbiased toward
the state and that it will not overstep the bounds of the state's consent and
interfere in matters of domestic policy.
71. ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 54, at 40.
72. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 20; see also, e.g., Treaty on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.K.-Bulg., Dec. 11, 1995, 1997 Gt.Brit. T.S. No. 52, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ukbulgaria.pdf ("desiring to create favourable
conditions for further development of investment by investors of one State in the territory of the other
state"); Tratado sobre Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, Arg.-F.R.G., Apr. 9, 1991, 3
Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties 1991, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iia/docs/bits/germany-argentina-sp.pdf ("con el prop6sito de crear condiciones favorables para las
inversions de los nacionales o sociedades de uno de los dos estados en el teritorio del otro Estado");
Convention concemant l'encouragement et la protection rrciproque des investissements, Switz.-Malay.,
Mar. 1, 1978, 1 Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties 1978, available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland.malaysiafr.pdf ("Dans l'intention de crrer des conditions
favorables A l'investissement de capitaux dans les deux Etats").
73. Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/1 0, Decision of the Tribunal on
Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, para. 29 (2005), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/
GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf.
74. UNCTAD, DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 52, at 1.
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An MFN claim is necessarily premised on the fact that the host state has
agreed to different dispute settlement provisions in different BITs. This
diversity of provisions requires explaining. One explanation is simply a
change in policy. The tribunal in Maffezini concluded that Argentina simply
"abandoned its prior policy" of requiring an eighteen-month waiting period
for domestic litigation and began to accept BITs allowing for direct access to
arbitration.75 In recent years, a number of states, including the United States,
have introduced greater flexibility in their BITs so that investors under the
newer BITs have a choice among arbitral fora.76
If such an explanation were always the case, there would be no difficulty
in applying the MFN clause, because it would both ensure equality of
treatment and allow the host state to change its policy without having to
renegotiate all of its pre-existing BITs. However, other factors may be at
work. By definition, it takes two states to agree to a bilateral treaty. If the
parties were on equal footing, we might expect a given BIT to closely
resemble a compilation of the less favorable of the two states' policies on each
specific matter. In fact, however, the negotiations are not always undertaken
on the basis of equality, especially where the BIT involves a capital-exporting
country and a capital-importing country. Not only may capital-importing
countries be desperate to attract foreign investment, but the negotiating
process itself is stacked against them. As Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens
point out, "[m]ost BIT negotiations take as their starting point model
agreements of capital-exporting countries. . . . A central part of BIT
negotiations would therefore concern modifications to such a model treaty that
may be deemed desirable by the capital-importing countries."77 A capital-
importing state may be unable to impose an identical policy on a given issue
with respect to all of its treaty partners, and may thus be forced to abandon a
provision-such as the waiting period at issue in Maffezini-in an individual
negotiation without necessarily changing its policy. While we may presume
that a given state is aware of its existing MFN commitments when it agrees to
a BIT, the state may reasonably (if, perhaps, erroneously) believe that a
provision related to dispute settlement would not be within the scope of those
existing commitments.
A further factor may be that bilateral relationships or the nature and
scope of investments emanating from a given country may affect a host state's
willingness to submit disputes to arbitration. The treaties implicated in
Siemens were all signed in 1991, and although both Chile and Argentina
insisted on the inclusion of a domestic litigation waiting period in their BITs
with Germany, they did not include such a provision in the Chile-Argentina
BIT. Similarly, when the Chile-Germany BIT was amended in 1997, Chilean
75. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 57, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 408 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilio-decisionjurisdiction.pdf.
76. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 147-56.
77. Id. at 13.
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investors were freed from the waiting period, but it was retained, albeit in
slightly modified form, for German investors in Chile.78
The reasons for this difference are not immediately apparent. It may be
that there are fewer investors directly concerned by the Chile-Argentina BIT
or that the type of investments made by German investors in Argentina is
fundamentally different than that made by Chilean investors. The Siemens
case involved a contract with a German company to establish a national
system of migration control and personal identification in Argentina. It may
be that contracts of such a sensitive nature and of national scope are more
likely to be made with German firms than with Chilean ones.
Whatever the reasons for the Latin American countries' reluctance to
consent to arbitration with German investors, their conduct is difficult to
reconcile with the idea that they (or German investors for that matter)
understood the MFN clauses in their BITs to apply to the dispute settlement
provisions.
2. The Role Purpose, and Functions of the MFN Clause
The MFN clause in a BIT is typically placed alongside guarantees of
"fair and equitable treatment" and "national treatment." A guarantee of fair
and equitable treatment incorporates into the treaty the minimum standard of
customary international law and thereby makes a violation of the customary
international law standard a violation of the treaty and subject to the treaty's
dispute settlement provisions. Such a provision establishes a floor below
which treatment cannot sink, for as the International Law Commission has
noted, "[a]ll that the most-favoured-nation clause promises is that the
contracting party concerned will treat the other party as well as it treats any
third State - which may be very badly."7 9 National treatment and MFN
provisions work together to ensure that there is no discrimination among
investors, regardless of their nationality. A foreign investor who benefits from
a BIT is therefore ordinarily entitled to whichever treatment is most favorable:
the treatment specified in the BIT between the investors' home country and
the host state, the treatment granted by the host state to its own investors, or
the treatment granted by the host state to investors of any third state.
The I.C.J. has stated that the purpose of an MFN clause is "to establish
and maintain at all times fundamental equality without discrimination among
78. See Tratado Sobre Fomento y Reciproca Protecci6n de Inversiones [Treaty for the
Promotion and Reciprocol Protection of Investments], Chile-F.R.G., art. 10, Oct. 21, 1991, 3 Investment
Promotion and Protection Treaties 1991, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iia/docs/bits/chile-germany-sp.pdf [hereinafter Chile-F.R.G Investment Treaty] (imposing waiting
period); Protocolo de Enmienda y Suplemento al Tratado Sobre el Fomento Reciproca Protecci6n de
Inversiones, del 21 de octubre 1991, [Amendment Protocol and Supplement to the Treaty for the
Promotoion and Reciprocol Protection of Investments of October 21, 1991], Chile-F.R.G., arts. 1, 4,
Apr. 14, 1997, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/chile-germany-sp.pdf [hereinafter
Chile-F.R.G. Protocol and Supplement] (modifying waiting period applicable to German investors and
abolishing it for Chilean investors).
79. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirtieth Session,
Commentary on Article 4, at P8, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
6, 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (pt. 2); see also LAVIEC, supra note 53, at 90 ("[Le
principe de traitement national accorde une protection juridique qui peut 8tre inf6rieure A un minimum
requis par le droit international .... ").
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all of the countries concerned."80 In the specific context of investment law, the
purpose has been described as one of "giv[ing] investors a guarantee against
certain forms of discrimination by host countries, and [establishing] equality
of competitive opportunities between investors from different foreign
countries. ' 81 It has also been suggested that the MFN clause aims to effect a
"general equalization of the legal conditions for competition" 82 or to
"harmoniz[e]' 83 or "abolish differences in the legal regime' 84 applicable to
foreign investors in a given state. Since this equalization or harmonization
results in convergence at the "most favorable" level of treatment, "MFN
clauses have ... become a significant instrument of economic liberalisation in
the investment area."
85
An MFN clause also has an important function in stabilizing
expectations over time so as to reassure investors about making long-term
investments. Absent the MFN clause, an investor would worry that the host
state might grant a competitor more favorable conditions for investment and
thereby drive the first investor out of business. The MFN clause ensures that
any more favorable treatment granted to investors from another country will
also inure to the first investor. Similarly, the MFN clause, if construed
broadly, reduces transaction costs for states wishing to adopt more investor-
friendly policies. 86 Rather than renegotiating a large number of BITs to
incorporate the change, a host state can simply agree to a single BIT with the
more favorable provision with the knowledge that by operation of the MFN
clauses, the new treatment will apply to investors from any country with a
BIT.87 Indeed, it has been said in the trade context that "[o]ne of the chief
advantages of the unconditional form is that it removes the necessity for
repetition of pledges every time conditions are altered by a new commercial
treaty." 88 However, this presumed benefit carries with it a cost in that it is a
80. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J.
176, 192 (Aug. 27).
81. UNCTAD, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, supra note 2, at 1.
82. EDOUARD SAUVIGNON, LA CLAUSE DE LA NATION PLUS FAVORISEE 4 (1972) ("6galisation
g~nrrale des conditions juridiques de la concurrence") (translation by author).
83. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 62, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 410 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisionJurisdiction.pdf, see also Gaillard 2005, supra note 63, at 158 (arguing that MFN
clauses have the double function of fighting discrimination and contributing to the harmonization of
international investment law).
84. LAVIEC, supra note 53, at 98 ("L'6galit6 de traitement accord&e par une clause n.p.f. abolit
les differences de regime juridique entre les investissements 6trangers qui en sont brnrficiaires.").
85. OECD, supra note 60, at 2.
86. See SAUVIGNON, supra note 82, at 3 (describing this feature of the MFN clause as a
technique for adapting treaties to changed circumstances); SNYDER, supra note 18, at 216 ("The very
existence of the clause represents the desire of nations . . . to avoid the repetition of previous
concessions in every new commercial treaty.").
87. For example, when the United States first began to sign treaties with the unconditional
form of the MFN clause, Secretary of State Cordell Hull explained to Congress that this meant that the
United States would henceforth only apply the unconditional version of the clause, notwithstanding the
continued existence of conditional clauses in many U.S. treaties, because " '[i]f, through the
unconditional clause in some other treaty one country obtains a favor 'freely,' countries entitled to
conditional most-favored-nation treatment become entitled to such favor without any condition."'
Memorandum, Hearing on H.R. 8430 Before the H. Ways & Means Comm., 73d Cong. 39 (1934),
quoted in SNYDER, supra note 18, at 34.
88. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 35.
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one-way ratchet. A country wishing to shift policy away from investor
protections in favor of other policy goals would need to renegotiate or
renounce every BIT incorporating the provisions it wishes to change. An
MFN clause thus creates a structural bias in favor of liberalization.
All of these apparent purposes of MFN clauses argue in favor of a broad
scope of the clause. Indeed, one commentator has argued that the promise of
equality of treatment in the MFN clause should apply even to matters outside
the subject matter of the basic treaty if their denial could create a disadvantage
89for beneficiaries of an MFN clause within that subject matter. In particular,
where private rights are at stake, the same commentator urged that the MFN
clause should procure to beneficiary nationals access to justice on the same
basis as those of the most favored state,90 as well as any more favorable rules
concerning jurisdiction in cases concerning commercial matters.91
More recent commentators have noted that one can make a similar
structural argument with regard to BITs in general: "Since most of the
substantive provisions of the BIT concern the promotion and protection of
foreign investment, it could be argued that any ambiguity should be
interpreted in a way that would favor the rights granted to a foreign
investor."92 However, they also emphasized the following caveat:
Such considerations may however be tempered by the fact that the general normative
effect of bilateral investment treaties in the final analysis depends on the extent to which
they are viewed as 'fair and balanced regimes for foreign investment outside the
immediate context of the bilateral relationship.'
93
In this vein, it is important to consider BIT provisions in light of the structure
of the relationship between investor and host state. Each provision of a BIT is,
in essence, a concession on the part of the host state that benefits the investor.
Thus while it is true that the purpose of the concessions contained in a BIT is
to promote and protect investment, it is equally true that the contracting
parties pursue other purposes by not making other concessions. The silences
of a BIT may thus be pregnant with matters that are of great import to the host
state and which are therefore deliberately excluded from the BIT.
The case for a generally "liberal" or pro-investor interpretation of BITs
is thus much weaker than it might first appear. Nevertheless, the case for a
broad application of the MFN clause remains undiminished. Unlike a liberal
reading of a substantive provision that might impose policy obligations on a
host state that it did not contemplate nor accept, a broad application of the
MFN clause requires only that, once the host state has agreed to grant a
particular treatment to one state's investors, the host state must accord the
same treatment to others. While "there is no fixed wording or formula of the
clause . . . its raison d 'tre is always the same; to establish between the
89. FRANCOIS HEPP, THEORIE GENERALE DE LA CLAUSE DE LA NATION LA PLUS FAVORISEE EN
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 87-88 (1914).
90. Id. at 117; see also Basdevant, supra note 15, at 13 (including "la protection devant les
tribunaux" among the rights which may be included in an MFN clause).
91. HEPP, supra note 89, at 124-25.
92. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 17.
93. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Samuel Asante, International Law and Investments, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 668, 676 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991)).
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contracting parties a treatment equal to that enjoyed by any third nation."94 It
would defeat this purpose to impose restrictions on the scope of the MFN
clause where no limitations or exceptions are apparent from the text, context,
or surrounding circumstances. Moreover, the variety of limitations that are
routinely written into MFN clauses demonstrate that states are able to craft
MFN clauses that are limited in scope if they so choose.
95
All of these considerations seem to compel the conclusion that "[a]
given clause applies, unless otherwise specifically provided, to all rights,
privileges, or immunities that a state accords in its actions as a public
institution to a third state," 96 and that this includes dispute settlement
provisions in a third-party BIT. Indeed, because access to international
arbitration is "perhaps the most important safeguard" afforded to investors
under bilateral investment treaties, it would be "something of a paradox" to
exclude this particular safeguard from the scope of the MFN clause.97 Thus, as
discussed in detail, infra, the Tribunal in Maffezini concluded that dispute
settlement is so integral to the protection provided by a BIT that the rights of
investors simply cannot be considered separately from the means for
enforcing those rights.
98
If, as in Maffezini, an investor from one state must wait twenty-four
months before gaining access to arbitration while a similarly situated investor
from another state can gain access after only six months, this poses an MFN
problem. This is not only because "time is money" or because justice delayed
can in some cases be justice denied,99 but also because the extended waiting
period, by increasing the cost and risk for an investor of litigating a dispute,
gives the host state broader leeway in its conduct and greater leverage in
settlement negotiations. The playing field is no longer level between investors
from different states.
C. "Ordinary Meaning" and "Treatment"
The most frequent formulation of the MFN clauses in the BIT context is
one that simply requires the host state to accord "treatment no less favorable"
94. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 48.
95. See generally id. at 245-46 (discussing restrictions placed on the clause). More
specifically, the MFN clause in the NAFTA is specifically limited to treatment "with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments." NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1103, at 639. These limits to the scope of the MFN clause
would clearly preclude its application to dispute settlement mechanisms.
96. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 33.
97. Gaillard 2005, supra note 63, at 163 (translated from French to English by author).
98. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,
para. 54, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 407-08 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf; see also Ambatielos Arbitration (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A.
83, 107 (Comm'n of Arb. 1956) (emphasizing the link between the rights of traders and the provisions
for protecting those rights).
99. One might envision instances in which such a delay in remedying an expropriation might
push an investor into bankruptcy or in which the delay makes it impossible for a would-be investor to
participate in a privatization scheme or other time-sensitive investment opportunity. In either case, a
remedy at a later date will be ineffective: in the former because it cannot undo the bankruptcy, and in the
latter because the potential gains from the missed opportunity may be too speculative to support an
award of damages.
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than that accorded to investors 100 from third states. However, the term
"treatment" is not self-defining. By way of example, the recent BIT between
Germany and Thailand included the following non-exhaustive list of treatment
that would violate the MFN clause:
The following shall, in particular, be deemed 'treatment less favourable' within the
meaning of this Article: unequal treatment in the case of restrictions on the purchase of
raw or auxiliary materials, of energy or fuel or of means of production or operation of
any kind, unequal treatment in the case of impeding the marketing of products inside or
outside the country, as well as any other measures having similar effects.'
0
'
These and similar lists of examples in other treaties do not provide any clear
guidance as to whether "treatment" includes or excludes dispute settlement
provisions. Here, again, the bulk of authority supports the view that tribunals
should not read restrictions into this term that are not apparent from the text,
context, or circumstances.
According to Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, "[t]reatment is a
broad term which in the context of BITs refers to the legal regime that applies
to investments once they have been admitted by the host State."' 02 Jean-Pierre
Laviec argues that the equality of treatment required by the MFN clause
abolishes all differences in the legal regime applicable to investors from the
countries concerned. 103 The Tribunal in Plama found that "It is not clear
whether the ordinary meaning of the term 'treatment' in the MFN provision of
the BIT includes or excludes dispute settlement provisions[,]" 104 but also
found that it was not necessary to resolve the question. The Tribunal in
Siemens, by contrast, concluded that "the term 'treatment' is so general that
the Tribunal cannot limit its application except as specifically agreed by the
parties."1
0 5
Opponents of this view might contend that parties have something more
specific in mind when they refer to "treatment." According to this view, the
overarching purpose of a BIT is to foster investment by imposing discipline
and constraints on the conduct of the host state toward foreign investors.
Where provisions refer to government "treatment" of investors or investments,
they are concerned with primary government conduct-i.e., the sorts of
100. A number of treaties distinguish between the treatment of investors and the treatment of
investments, even to the point of including different MFN provisions for the two. E.g. Agreement on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Switz.-Mex., arts. 4(2), 4(3), July 10, 1995, 4
Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties 1995, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/
iia/docs/bits/mexico.switzerland.pdf; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-
Croat., arts. 4(1), 4(2), Feb. 3 1997, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
canada..croatia.pdf; however, the distinction does not affect the general analysis here, therefore the term
investor is used for ease of reference.
101. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Thail.-
F.R.G., art. 3(2), June 24, 2002, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany-thailand.pdf.
102. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 58, citing LAVIEC, supra note 53, at 79 ("Une fois
admis, un investissement est soumis A un regime juridique donn6, d~termin6 par I'Etat territorial, que le
terme de «traitement>) recouvre.").
103. LAvIEC,supra note 53, at 98.
104. Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 189, 44 I.L.M. 721, 750 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-
decision.pdf.
105. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, para.
106 (2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision.pdf.
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actions by the government that might give rise to a claim by an investor. The
function of the provisions on fair and equitable treatment, national treatment,
and MFN work together to set a floor for such conduct by the state and to
ensure that the host state does not discriminate in granting treatment above
that floor.
Such a critique, however, amounts to an argument that the term
"treatment" has a special meaning in the context of a given BIT, or perhaps in
BITs generally, that is more restrictive than the term itself suggests. Article
31(4) of the Vienna Convention provides for such situations, but places the
burden squarely on the party advocating the special meaning. 10 6 Thus in the
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, when Norway contended that the
word "Greenland" in certain legal documents referred only to the colonized
area of the West coast, the Permanent Court said that "[t]his is a point as to
which the burden of proof lies on Norway .... If it is alleged by one of the
Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it, it
lies on that Party to establish its contention." 10 7 In individual cases, therefore,
it may be possible to make textual or contextual arguments that the parties
meant something more specific and narrow than the broad term "treatment"
would imply. 10 8 Whether or not such a hypothetical argument would succeed
in a given case, the point is that the party arguing for such a special meaning
bears the burden of persuading the tribunal that the more restrictive meaning
was intended.
As a general matter of interpretation, therefore, the advocates of
including dispute settlement with the scope of MFN clauses have the stronger
case, at least where the clause is broadly worded. Ultimately, however,
tribunals may not rely on general cases or presumptions but must interpret
each BIT, and each MFN clause, on its own terms. Differences in wording and
context, the existence (or lack) of evidence about the parties' actual intent,
concerns about treaty shopping, and other pragmatic issues will all need to be
factored into any tribunal's decision about how to interpret and apply a given
MFN clause. Specific cases, meanwhile, must be evaluated against the
broader purposes of the international investment law system. As Charles
Calvo argued, where a term is unclear or susceptible to multiple meanings,
one must "be concerned with the practical consequences, with the justice or
injustice, the advantage or disadvantage that may result from giving it a
particular meaning."'°9
106. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 31(4) ("A special meaning shall be given to a term
if it is established that the parties so intended.").
107. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 49
(Apr. 5).
108. In the NAFTA, for example, an argument could be made that, even in the absence of the
limiting text within the MFN clause itself, which clearly does not extend to dispute settlement, the
clause would, in any event, not apply to dispute settlement, because the scope of the entire investment
chapter is limited to "measures adopted or maintained by a party[,]" NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1101, at
639, and the term "measure" is used throughout the treaty in a manner that is limited to the domestic
actions of the NAFTA states.
109. CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL § 715, at 671 (Georges Jacob Orleans 1880)
("[I]l faut se prroccuper des consequences pratiques, de la justice ou de l'injustice, de l'avantage ou du
drsavantage pouvant rrsulter de la signification particuliire qui sera donnre A une expression douteuse
ou susceptible de plusieurs sens.").
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IV. THE I.C.J. ON MFN CLAUSES AND JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
Much of the debate over the proper scope and meaning of MFN clauses
has focused on the few statements on the subject made by the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.). In a small number of cases, the I.C.J. has been called
on to interpret the scope of a given MFN clause as it related to the jurisdiction
of the I.C.J. itself or another forum. The I.C.J.'s pronouncements have not
done much to clarify the subject, nor have they directly addressed the issues at
stake in recent investment arbitrations. Nevertheless, the I.C.J. case law
addresses a number of interpretive questions with important implications for
current investment disputes.
Of particular importance is the Anglo-Iranian Oil case, in which the
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. itself was in question, as well as the Ambatielos case,
in which the I.C.J. ordered the United Kingdom to submit to arbitration on the
question of whether the MFN clause in its treaty with Greece applied to
matters of administration of justice and in which the arbitral commission
concluded that such matters were within the scope of the MFN clause. Also of
some interest is the Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco case, in which the
I.C.J. emphasized that rights obtained through an MFN clause are dependent
on the continuing existence of the third-party treaty from which they are
derived. These cases will be discussed in chronological order.
A. Anglo-Iranian Oil' 10
On May 10, 1927, Iran denounced all treaties then in effect relating to
the system of capitulations."' Three years later, Iran adopted a declaration in
which it accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (P.C.I.J.), but only for disputes arising after its
declaration and based on treaties or conventions subsequent to the declaration.
The United Kingdom had a longstanding treaty with Persia that was not
specifically denounced and which contained an MFN clause. The United
Kingdom maintained that this MFN clause entitled its citizens to the same
treatment as was guaranteed to citizens of Denmark under a post-declaration
treaty. Iran contested the Court's jurisdiction on the basis that Iran had not
consented to the Permanent Court's jurisdiction over disputes concerning its
treaty with the United Kingdom.
The I.C.J., as successor to the P.C.I.J., held that it lacked jurisdiction
because the base treaty between United Kingdom and Persia was entered
before the declaration and therefore could not provide the basis for
jurisdiction. The Court rejected the United Kingdom's argument that the
dispute 'directly' concerned the Treaty of 1934 between Denmark and Iran, a
treaty accepted by Iran after the ratification of her declaration, because the
United Kingdom did not have any right to invoke the Denmark-Iran treaty.
The Court explained:
I 10. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22).
III. Id. at 105.
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[l]n order that the United Kingdom may enjoy the benefit of any treaty concluded by Iran
with a third party by virtue of a most-favoured-nation clause contained in a treaty
concluded by the United Kingdom with Iran, the United Kingdom must be in a position
to invoke the latter treaty. The treaty containing the most-favoured-nation clause is the
basic treaty upon which the United Kingdom must rely. It is this treaty which establishes
the juridical link between the United Kingdom and a third-party treaty and confers upon
that state the rights enjoyed by the third party. A third-party treaty, independent of and
isolated from the basic treaty, cannot produce any legal effect as between the United
Kingdom and Iran: it is res inter alios acta.
12
The Court further rejected an alternative version of the argument proposed by
the United Kingdom.
If Denmark, it is argued, can bring before the Court questions as to the application of her
1934 Treaty with Iran, and if the United Kingdom cannot bring before the Court
questions as to the application of the same Treaty to the benefit of which she is entitled
under the most-favoured-nation clause, then the United Kingdom would not be in the
position of the most-favoured-nation. The Court needs only observe that the most-
favoured-nation clause in the [Anglo-Persian] Treaties of 1857 and 1903 between Iran
and the United Kingdom has no relation whatever to jurisdictional matters between the
two Governments. If Denmark is entitled... to bring before the Court any dispute as to
the application of its Treaty with Iran, it is because that Treaty is subsequent to the
ratification of the Iranian Declaration. This can not give rise to any question relating to
most-favoured-nation treatment. 113
The reasoning of the I.C.J.'s decision here is far from clear. Is it that
consent to jurisdiction of the I.C.J. is not "treatment" within the meaning of
the MFN clause? Or is it that jurisdictional questions are separate from
substantive ones, i.e. that the MFN clause entitles the United Kingdom to the
same substantive treatment as Denmark, but that the United Kingdom cannot
invoke the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction for a determination of whether British nationals
are getting the treatment to which they are entitled?
The Court first states that it is not necessary to consider the "meaning
and the scope" of the MFN clause and that the Court may "confine[] itself' to
the dates in order to conclude that the United Kingdom cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court.1 14 Then, in response to what it viewed as a "quite
different form" of the United Kingdom's MFN argument, the Court appears to
hold that the jurisdiction of the Court is outside the scope of the MFN clause
itself-stating that the MFN clause "has no relation whatever to jurisdictional
matters"--but then immediatelyz returns to the dates as if their recitation were
enough to resolve the matter. The Court accepts that the MFN clause in the
United Kingdom's treaty entitles British nationals to the same substantive
treatment as Danish nationals but also accepts that Denmark can invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court to enforce its treaty rights but the United Kingdom
cannot. Nevertheless the I.C.J. concludes without explanation that this
difference in treatment of British and Danish nationals "can not give rise to
any question relating to most-favoured-nation treatment."t 
6
112. Id. at 109.
113. Id. at 108-09, 110.
114. Id. at 109.
115. Id. at 110.
116. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1952 I.C.J. 110 (July 22).
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In his separate, concurring opinion, President Arnold McNair provided a
clearer explanation. McNair emphasized that the "Court ... must be satisfied
that any State which is brought before it by virtue of such a Declaration has
consented to the jurisdiction." 117 He also cited the Chorzow Factory Case for
the following proposition:
[T]he Court will ... only affirm its jurisdiction provided that the force of the arguments
militating in favour of it is preponderant .... When considering whether it has
jurisdiction or not, the Court's aim is always to ascertain whether an intention on the part
of the Parties exists to confer jurisdiction upon it. 18
Since the Iranian Declaration specifically excluded consent for disputes
arising out of pre-Declaration treaties such as the Anglo-Persian treaty, there
could be no jurisdiction.
McNair also emphasized two aspects of the case which are relevant to
the broader issues implicated in the case. First, he noted "the large part that
had been played by the most-favoured-nation clauses in creating the network
of the capitulatory system in Iran and elsewhere" as an important factor in
understanding the intentions of Iran in its Declaration; for "from the point of
view of a State which had been subject to a system of Capitulations for at least
a century and had only recently denounced them and emerged into a new
status, it would be surprising if the most-favoured-nation principle was not
regarded as an obnoxious concomitant of that system."' 9Second, McNair
expressly acknowledged that the United Kingdom would have been able to
rely on the MFN clause on the merits had it been able to surmount the
jurisdictional hurdle presented by the Iranian declaration:
Unquestionably, if the jurisdiction of the Court in this case had already been established
and if the Court was now dealing with the merits, the United Kingdom would be entitled
to invoke against Iran the most-favoured-nation clause.., of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of
1857, for the purpose of claiming the benefit of the provisions of the Irano-Danish Treaty
of 1934 as the treatment of foreign nationals and their property. But that is not the
question now before the Court. The question is whether the United Kingdom can
effectively base the jurisdiction of the Court on the Irano-Danish Treaty of 1934 as a
treaty 'post~rieur A la ratification de cette declaration'-which is quite another matter.
120
In his dissent, Judge Hackworth objected to the Court's approach, which
in his view addressed the jurisdictional question from the wrong direction.
The "basic" treaty, in his view, was the one defining the substantive rights in
dispute:
The gravamen of the complaint of the United Kingdom Government is that Iran has not
accorded to a British national, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the benefits of
international law and that, as a result, the Company has suffered a denial of justice. The
provisions with respect to the application of the principles of international law are not to
be found in the most-favoured-nation clause of the earlier treaties of 1857 and 1903
between Iran and the United Kingdom, but are embodied in the later treaties between Iran
and Denmark of 1934; between Iran and Switzerland of that same year, and between Iran
117. Id. at 116-17 (McNair, Pres., concurring).
118. Id., quoting Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No. 9, at 32 (July
26), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/l927.07.26_chorzow/.
119. Anglo-Iranian Oil, 1952 I.C.J. at 119.
120. Id. at 122.
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and Turkey of 1937. It is to these treaties and not to the most-favoured-nation clause that
we must look in determining the rights of British nationals in Iran.121
For Hackworth, the United Kingdom was not trying to invoke or enforce any
provision of an objectionable, capitulation-era treaty, but was merely trying to
secure for its nationals the same treatment to which Danish nationals were
entitled by their post-Declaration treaty-treatment to which the United
Kingdom was entitled under the MFN clause. Since the facts giving rise to the
dispute and the substantive rules of law applicable to the dispute (the Danish
treaty) post-dated the declaration, Hackworth saw I.C.J. jurisdiction as
perfectly compatible with the Iranian declaration.
Hackworth worried that the Court's restrictive reading of the Iranian
declaration was rooted more in the Court's presumptions than in an effort to
understand the intent of the government of Iran through a close reading of the
text:
[W]hen a State has filed a declaration . . . accepting jurisdiction, it has performed a
voluntary act ....
It is no part of the functions of the court to give such a declaration a broader
meaning or a more restrictive meaning than the State itself has seen fit to prescribe. Our
duty is to find that plain and reasonable meaning which more nearly comports with the
purpose of the State as disclosed by the language which it itself has employed.' 22
Implicit in Hackworth's dissent is the view that Iran's purpose in the
Declaration was to prevent the I.C.J. from hearing any claim against it
premised on the onerous provisions of a capitulation era treaty. Since the
United Kingdom was only seeking treatment which Iran had consented to
after the Declaration-and that treatment consisted solely in the minimum
requirements of customary international law, there was no problem. This
ignores the possibility, however, that one of Iran's purposes may have been to
force countries with pre-Declaration treaties to renegotiate new treaties with
Iran on a footing of equality. This latter purpose would be defeated by
Hackworth's proposed interpretation.
In a second dissent, Judge Read expressly rejected the "theory of
restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional clauses":
It has been contended that the Court should apply a restrictive construction to the
provisions of the Declaration, because it is a treaty provision or clause conferring
jurisdiction on the Court. Further, it has been suggested that a jurisdictional clause is a
limitation upon the sovereignty of a State, and that, therefore, it should be strictly
construed.
The making of a declaration is an exercise of state sovereignty and not, in any
sense, a limitation. It should therefore be construed in such a manner as to give effect to
the intention of the State, as indicated by the words used; and not by a restrictive
interpretation, designed to frustrate the intention of the State in exercising this sovereign
power. 1
2 3
121. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1952 I.C.J. 110, 137-3
(July 22) (Hackworth, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 139-40.
123. Id. at 143 (Read, J., dissenting).
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
It is important to note that the majority did not expressly adopt (nor reject) a
theory of restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional clauses 124 and no such
presumption was required to reach the Court's result.
Read is surely correct that a declaration or treaty by which a state
accepts the Court's jurisdiction should be interpreted neither broadly nor
strictly but rather in a manner that gives effect to the state's intention.
However, the import of the Permanent Court's statement in the Chorzow
Factory Case quoted by President McNair was not to impose a presumption
against jurisdiction but rather to place a burden on the party seeking to invoke
jurisdiction to show, by a preponderance of arguments, that consent to
jurisdiction has in fact been granted. For the Court's majority, the
combination of an MFN clause with the host state's consent to jurisdiction
over disputes with a third state was not enough to establish consent, and the
terms and purpose of the Iranian declaration were preponderant considerations
in the other direction. Understood in this manner, Anglo-Iranian Oil has
particular relevance for contemporary disputes over MFN clauses and dispute
settlement.
B. Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco'25
This case involved two separate MFN holdings. First, the Court held that
an MFN clause entitled the United States to protest discrimination in favor of
France concerning imports into the French zone of Morocco. This holding is
neither controversial nor particularly relevant to contemporary investment
disputes. Second, the Court held that the United States could not use its MFN
clause to import consular rights from a treaty that was no longer in force.
In the past, the United States had enjoyed the same consular rights as
Spain and the United Kingdom by virtue of the MFN clause in its treaty with
Morocco. However, when Spain and the United Kingdom renounced these
rights, the United States nevertheless claimed it was entitled to continue to
enjoy the same rights on the theory that these provisions had been
incorporated by reference into the United States's treaty or, alternatively, that
the United States was entitled to continue in the enjoyment of those rights as a
matter of custom and usage. The I.C.J. emphatically rejected both arguments.
As to the MFN argument, the Court held that:
It is sufficient to reject this argument on the ground that it would lead to a position in
which the United States was entitled to exercise consular jurisdiction in the French Zone
notwithstanding the loss of this right by Great Britain. This result would be contrary to
the intention of the most-favoured-nation clauses to establish and maintain at all times
fundamental equality without discrimination as between the countries concerned. 1
26
The court went on to reject the U.S. contention that its consular rights were
founded on "custom and usage":
124. See Mondev Int'l v. U.S. Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 192 (2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
125. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J.
176 (Aug. 27).
126. Id. at 192.
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[T]he United States consular jurisdiction was in fact based, not on custom or usage, but
on treaty rights. At all stages, it was based on the provisions either of the Treaty of 1787
or of the Treaty of 1836, together with the provisions of treaties concluded by Morocco
with other Powers, especially with Great Britain and Spain, invoked by virtue of the
most-favoured-nation clauses. 127
Consequently, when the treaties of Great Britain and Spain were no longer in
force, the United States could no longer claim the benefit of their provisions.
C. Ambatielos (I. C.J.) 128
The Anglo-Greek Declaration of 1926 provided that disputes about the
validity of claims under the 1886 Anglo-Greek commercial treaty were to be
submitted to a Commission of Arbitration for binding resolution. The Greek
claimant had initially brought his claim against the U.K. government in a U.K.
court, but after his claim was rejected by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, he declined to pursue an appeal to the House of Lords and instead
sought to claim that the conduct of the courts and the U.K. government during
these proceedings amounted to a denial of justice, that this denial of justice
was a violation of various treaties between the United Kingdom and third
states incorporating customary international law standards, and that Greece
was entitled to invoke these treaties by virtue of the MFN clause in the 1886
Anglo-Greek treaty. The Court summarized the legal dispute between the
parties as follows:
The United Kingdom Government . . . contends that Article X of the Treaty of 1886,
dealing with matters of commerce and navigation, cannot be invoked to claim the
benefits of provisions in other treaties concerning judicial proceedings, which, in the
Treaty of 1886, form the subject of a separate article .... On the other hand, the Hellenic
Government has contended that a litigation arising out of a commercial contract may be
considered as a matter relating to commerce and thus falling within the term 'all matters
relating to commerce and navigation' to which the most-favoured nation clause in Article
X of the Treaty of 1886 applies.'
29
The I.C.J. did not directly address this question, but instead held that it
presented a bona fide dispute regarding the interpretation of the 1886 treaty,
and therefore was to be resolved by a Commission of Arbitration.
While not addressing the merits, the Court's opinion did consider the
principle that a state must consent to arbitration:
The Court is not departing from the principle, which is well-established in international
law and accepted by its own jurisprudence as well as that of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, to the effect that a State may not be compelled to submit its disputes
to arbitration without its consent; but it observes that, in this case, the question is whether
the consent given by the Parties in signing the Declaration of 1926 to arbitrate a certain
category of disputes, does or does not extend to the Ambatielos claim.
30
127. Id. at 199.
128. Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 10 (May 19).
129. Id. at 21.
130. Id. at 19.
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The Court thus rejected the idea, advanced recently by the Tribunal in Plama,
that a state's consent to arbitration should be construed narrowly.'
3
Writing for four dissenters, President McNair objected to the Court's
central holding because, in his view, the ejusdem generis principle precluded
an MFN clause in a commercial treaty from applying to judicial matters. 132
D. Ambatielos (Commission ofArbitration)133
The Commission of Arbitration ultimately held that the scope of the
MFN clause could indeed extend to the administration of justice, but that, as a
matter of substantive law, it "applies only to privileges, favours and
immunities granted to other countries, and therefore cannot incorporate the
principles of international law in the said Treaty."' 34 Thus the Greek claimant
was denied relief. Since the decision of the Commission bears directly on the
issue presented in recent investment arbitrations and has been discussed
extensively therein, it is therefore worth quoting at some length.
The Commission began by noting that the scope of an MFN clause is
limited and "can only attract matters belonging to the same category of subject
as that to which the clause itself relates." 35 In the treaty at issue, the MFN
clause was defined as including "all matters relating to commerce and
navigation." 136 In the Commission's view, this expression "has not, in itself, a
strictly defined meaning" and that "in practice, the meaning given to it is
fairly flexible." 137 The Commission expressed its conclusion that the
administration of justice was within the scope of the MFN clause in the
following terms:
It is true that the 'administration of justice,' when viewed in isolation, is a subject-matter
other than 'commerce and navigation,' but this is not necessarily so when it is viewed in
connection with the protection of the rights of traders. Protection of the rights of traders
naturally finds a place among the matters dealt with by Treaties of commerce and
navigation.
Therefore it cannot be said that the administration of justice, in so far as it is
concerned with the protection of these rights, must necessarily be excluded from the field
of application of the most-favoured-nation clause, when the latter includes 'all matters
relating to commerce and navigation.'138
131. Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 198, 44 I.L.M. 721, 751-752 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-
decision.pdf.
As discussed further, infra, the Plama tribunal conflated the question of the existence vel non of
a state's consent to arbitrate with the question of the scope of a state's consent. While the Plama tribunal
is correct that consent to arbitrate must be clearly and unambiguously expressed, where consent is
clearly present, the question of the scope of that consent does not oblige arbitrators to place their thumbs
on the scale against jurisdiction.
132. Ambatielos Case, 1953 l.C.J. at 34 (McNair, Pres., dissenting) ("But, having regard to its
terms, Article X promises most-favoured-nation treatment only in matters of commerce and navigation;
it makes no provision concerning the administration of justice ... The most-favoured-nation clause in
Article X cannot be extended to matters other than those in respect of which it has been stipulated.").
133. Ambatielos Arbitration (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 (Comm'n of Arb. 1956).
134. Id. at 108.
135. Id. at 107.
136. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
137. id.
138. Ambatielos Arbitration (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83, 107 (Comm'n of Arb. 1956).
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Ultimately, the Commission concluded, the scope of an MFN clause
"can only be determined in accordance with the intention of the Contracting
Parties as deduced from a reasonable interpretation of the Treaty."' 3 9 In light
of the wording of Article X, which included the phrase, "it being their (the
Contracting Parties') intention that the trade and navigation of each country
shall be placed, in all respects, by the other on the footing of the most
favoured nation,"'140 the Commission concluded that the parties intended for
jurisdictional matters to be within the scope of the MFN clause.
Transposed to the investment context, this award stands, at a minimum,
for the proposition that, absent textual indications to the contrary, if an
investment treaty contains a broad MFN clause to the effect that the
investments and investors of each country shall be placed "in all respects" by
the other on the footing of the most-favored-nation, such a clause also applies
to provisions within the treaty concerning the protection of the rights of
investors. As discussed infra, the arbitral awards in Maffezini and Siemens are
clearly consistent with this holding. However, it does not follow that the
contrary results in Salini and Plama are incompatible with Ambatielos because
they occurred in cases in which the MFN clause was less expansively worded
than the one at issue in Ambatielos and in which other parts of the treaty more
clearly indicated the parties' intentions with respect to dispute settlement
mechanisms.
IV. THE MFN CLAUSE IN INVESTMIENT ARBITRATIONS: 1990-2006
In recent years, MFN clauses have been at issue in a growing number of
investment arbitrations. A number of cases have directly addressed the
relationship between MFN clauses and dispute settlement provisions. These
include: Maffezini v. Spain,'14 1 Siemens v. Argentina,142 Salini v. Jordan,143 and
Plama v. Bulgaria.144 Three additional cases-Asian Agricultural Products v.
Sri Lanka, 145 Yaung Chee O0 Trading v. Myanmar, 146 and Tecmed v.
Mexico 147-- have addressed MFN clauses in a more tangential way, but the
statements of these tribunals are nevertheless worth considering carefully, in
particular because they may have mischievous consequences if taken as
authoritative by subsequent tribunals. This Part discusses each of these cases
139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted).
141. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID (W.
Bank) 396 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/emilio-
DecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
142. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004).
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision-en.pdf.
143. Salini Costruttori S.p.A v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction,
44 I.L.M. 573 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/salini-decision-en.pdf.
144. Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44
I.L.M. 721 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-decision.pdf.
145. Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, 30
I.L.M. 580 (1991).
146. Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar, ASEAN Case No. ARB/01/1, Award, 8 ICSID (W.
Bank) 452 (2003).
147. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 43 I.L.M. 133 (2003),
available at http://www.investmentclaims.comdecisions/Tecnicas-Mexico-Award-29May203-Eng.pdf.
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in chronological order so as to highlight the development of the jurisprudence
as well as the dialogue among the various tribunals.
A. Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka
148
The interest of Asian Agricultural Products lies not only in the dramatic
circumstances in which it arose, but also because it raised a question which
remains unanswered, i.e. whether a claimant invoking an MFN clause must
prove that the provisions in a third-party treaty are objectively more favorable,
or merely that they are more favorable in that claimant's particular
circumstances.
In the context of Sri Lanka's ongoing civil conflict, Sri Lankan armed
forces requisitioned and destroyed a British company's farm, killing a large
number of employees in the process. Sri Lanka claimed that the destruction of
the farm was incidental to its military campaign and that the BIT contained an
exemption for war and civil disturbance. The company sought to circumvent
the exemption by reference to the Swiss treaty, which did not contain an
equivalent clause. The Tribunal, however, rejected the company's argument as
being premised on an incorrect view that the Sri Lanka-Switzerland Treaty
imposed a more favorable standard of strict liability for protection and
security of investments. 149 The Tribunal nevertheless held that the Claimant
was entitled to recover because the Sri Lanka authorities had failed to meet
the minimum standard of customary international law requiring due diligence
in avoiding unnecessary damage to property.'so
In addressing the MFN argument, the Tribunal noted that, because it did
not interpret the Sri Lanka-Switzerland treaty as imposing strict liability, "it is
not proven that the Sri Lanka/Switzerland Treaty contains rules more
favorable than those provided for under the Sri Lanka/U.K. Treaty, and hence,
Article 3 of the latter Treaty [the MFN clause] cannot be justifiably invoked in
the present case."' 15 The Tribunal thus highlighted the fact that a claimant
bears the burden of proving that the provisions it seeks to import from a third-
party treaty are in fact more favorable than the analogous provisions of the
treaty between the host state and the claimant's home country.
The Tribunal did not, however, address the nature of the burden facing
the claimant, for example, whether a claimant must prove that the dispute
settlement provisions are objectively more favorable as a general matter, or
whether it would be enough to show that, in the claimant's particular factual
circumstances, the dispute settlement provisions of another treaty would be
more favorable. It does not appear that any tribunal has specifically addressed
this issue, but it would seem that in order to avoid a situation in which the
applicable law depends on the specific factual circumstances of the individual
claimant, the burden on a claimant should be to show that the desired dispute
settlement provisions are objectively more favorable.
148. Asian Agricultural Products, 30 I.L.M. at 580.
149. Id. para. 54, at 602-03.
150. Id. paras. 67-86, at 608-19.
151. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,
para. 54, 30 I.L.M. 580, 602-03 (1991).
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The Tribunal also held forth at some length about the rules of treaty
interpretation, and there was a dispute between the majority and the
dissenter-who believed that the claim should have been dismissed outright-
concerning the application of the 'generalia specialibus non derogant'
principle. The dissent quoted the following statement of the principle from
Haratzi:
According to this principle proclaimed by Grotius, at the interpretation of treaties the
proper course is to guarantee priority to the specific provisions against the provisions of a
general nature of the treaty, or in other words, the existence of a specific provision will
withdraw a question governed by it from under the effect of the general provisions of the
treaty. 152
This principle has been evoked as an argument against allowing a claimant to
import provisions through an MFN clause that would contradict specific
provisions of the claimant's own BIT. One must be wary of any attempt to
apply this principle of interpretation to an MFN clause, because it risks
nullifying the purpose of the clause. An MFN clause is always general, yet its
purpose is to replace a specific provision in the same treaty with an equally
specific, but more favorable, provision from another treaty.
B. Maffezini v. Spain 153
The leading case in this area is Maffezini, which was the first case to
hold that an investor could import the dispute settlement provisions from a
third-party treaty. The case involved a dispute between, on the one side, an
Argentinian who had invested in an enterprise for the production and
distribution of chemical products in the Spanish region of Galicia and, on the
other side, the Spanish government. The Argentina-Spain BIT included an
eighteen-month domestic litigation waiting period before an investor could
initiate ICSID arbitration. 154 The claimant invoked the MFN clause in the
Argentina-Spain BIT, together with the absence of a waiting period in Spain's
BIT with Chile, in order to avoid the necessity of litigation in Spanish courts
and proceed directly to ICSID arbitration.
Maffezini is thus the first of the recent decisions to address directly the
question of whether an MFN clause entitles a claimant to invoke dispute
settlement provisions from third-party treaties. The Tribunal's affirmative
response to the question has drawn a fair amount of comment from subsequent
tribunals and commentators. 155 The facts of the Maffezini case were somewhat
152. Id. at 636 (Asante, J., dissenting) (quoting GYORGY HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES (1973)).
153. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID (W.
Bank) 396 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
154. Acuerdo para la Promoci6n y la Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones [Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Reciprocal Investments], Arg.-Spain, art. X, §3(a), 3 Investment Promotion
and Protection Treaties 1991 [hereinafter Arg.-Spain Investment Treaty], quoted in Maffezini, para. 24, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) at 400-01.
155. See discussion of Salini, infra Section V.F, and Plama, infra Section V.G. For a critical
assessment of the Maffezini award, see Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute
Settlement Resolution Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point, 8 INT'L ARB. L. R. 131
(2005). For more favorable assessments, see John Boscariol and Orlando Silva, The Widening
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
unusual in that they involved an investor from a more typically capital-
importing country (Argentina) bringing a claim against the government of a
capital-exporting country (Spain). This role reversal, coupled with the fact that
Spain routinely seeks access to arbitration for its own investors, meant that
Spain's arguments against arbitral jurisdiction could not be based on public
policy considerations. One wonders whether a different result might have
been reached in this landmark case had the legal question been presented in a
more typical fact scenario-such as that in Siemens v. Argentina. In any event
it is important to bear in mind the north-south dimension of debates over the
applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement mechanisms, since a broad
reading of the MFN clause will tend to benefit investors at the expense of host
states, whereas a narrow reading will have the opposite effect.
156
The legal question presented in Maffezini was whether or not an
Argentinean investor could avoid the provision in the Spain-Argentina BIT
requiring that a claimant bring proceedings in a domestic court and allow
those proceedings to continue for eighteen months prior to resorting to
international arbitration. The provision did not require exhaustion of domestic
remedies,1 57 and therefore essentially constituted an extended waiting period
prior to the initiation of arbitration. The claimant sought to circumvent this
waiting period by means of the MFN clause and the Spain-Chile BIT, which
allowed Chilean investors in Spain to go straight to arbitration. In concluding
that the investor could benefit from the more favorable provisions of the
Spain-Chile BIT, the Tribunal emphasized that in different circumstances, i.e.
if the host state had made the exhaustion of domestic remedies a condition for
its consent to arbitration under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, the
Tribunal would reject jurisdiction absent such exhaustion, even if a third-party
BIT contained no exhaustion requirement.' 
58
The MFN clause in the Spain-Argentina BIT provided that "[i]n all
matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable
than that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by
investors of a third country.', 159 In order to determine the scope of this clause,
the Tribunal cited the Anglo-Iranian Oil case for the idea that the scope of a
Application of the MFN Obligation and its Impact on Investor Protection, II INT'L TRADE L. & REG. 61
(2005); Gaillard 2005, supra note 63, at 157-63 (discussing the holding of Maffezini in the context of
commentary on Siemens).
156. This has also been a feature of the MFN clause in other contexts. In its Commentary on
the Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, the International Law Commission noted the
"problem which the application of the most-favoured-nation clause creates in the field of economic
relations when a striking inequality exists between the development of the States concerned" and
"devoted special attention to the manner in which the need of developing countries for preferences in the
form of exceptions to the most-favoured-nation clause in the field of economic relations can be given
expression in legal rules." Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
Work of Its Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 6,
12, 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.l. The Draft Articles accordingly included Article 24,
which provides that "A developed beneficiary state is not entitled under a most-favoured-nation clause
to any preferential treatment in the field of trade extended by a developing granting state to a developing
third state... Id. at 155.
157. Maffezini, paras. 29-31, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) at 401-02.
158. Id. para. 63, at410.
159. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 38, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 404 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf, quoting Arg.-Spain Investment Treaty, supra note 154, art. IV, § 2.
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claimant's rights under the MFN clause was to be determined by looking at
the "basic" treaty, i.e. the Spain-Argentina BIT:
[I]f, as the Tribunal believes, the right approach is to consider that the subject matter to
which the clause applies is indeed established by the basic treaty, it follows that if these
matters are more favorably treated in a third-party treaty then, by operation of the clause,
that treatment is extended to the beneficiary under the basic treaty.'
The Tribunal then turned to the ejusdem generis question, i.e. whether or not
dispute settlement provisions belonged "to the same category of subject as
that to which the clause itself relates" and discussed the decision of the
Commission of Arbitration in Ambatielos. 161 The Tribunal followed
Ambatielos and concluded that:
Notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the clause does not refer
expressly to dispute settlement as covered by the most favored nation clause, the Tribunal
considers that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement
arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are
also related to the protection of rights of traders under treaties of commerce....
These modem developments are essential, however, to the protection of the rights
envisaged under the pertinent treaties; they are also closely linked to the material aspects
of the treatment accorded. Traders and investors, like their States of nationality, have
traditionally felt that their rights and interests are better protected by recourse to
international arbitration than by submission of disputes to domestic courts, while the host
governments have traditionally felt that the protection of domestic courts is to be
preferred ....
From the above considerations it can be concluded that if a third-party treaty
contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protection
of the investor's rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be
extended to the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause as they are fully compatible
with the ejusdem generis principle.162
The upshot of the Tribunal's holding is that it is neither possible nor
desirable to separate treaty rights from treaty remedies and then to apply the
MFN principle only to the rights and not to the remedies. Indeed, from the
perspective of investors, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say
that their rights exist only to the extent that they can be enforced through
binding international arbitration. Under this view, therefore, more favorable
dispute settlement procedures are tantamount to more favorable rights.
The Tribunal qualified its holding that the MFN clause could be used to
import dispute settlement provisions from a third-party treaty by noting that
"[t]his operation of the most favored nation clause does, however, have some
important limits arising from public policy considerations .... ." 163 In
particular, the Tribunal announced that "[a]s a matter of principle, the
beneficiary of the clause should not be able to override public policy
considerations that the contracting parties might have envisaged as
160. Id. para. 45, at 405.
161. Id. para. 49, at 406, quoting Ambatielos Arbitration (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83, 107
(Comm'n of Arb. 1956).
162. Id. paras. 54-56, at 407-08 (footnotes omitted).
163. Maffezini, para. 56, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) at 408.
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fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in
question ....,, 164
The Tribunal went on to identify four such "situations not present in the
instant case."
' 165
1. "[I]f one contracting party has conditioned its consent to arbitration on
the exhaustion of local remedies, . . . this requirement could not be
bypassed by invoking the most favored nation clause . . . since the
stipulated condition reflects a fundamental rule of international law."
' 66
2. A so-called fork-in-the-road provision requiring an irrevocable choice
between submission of the dispute to domestic courts or international
arbitration "cannot be bypassed by invoking the clause," because "it
would upset the finality of arrangements that many countries deem
important as a matter of public policy."'
' 67
3. "[I]f the agreement provides for a particular arbitration forum, such as
ICSID, for example, this option cannot be changed by invoking the
clause, in order to refer the dispute to a different system of
arbitration."
'1 68
4. "[I]f the parties have agreed to a highly institutionalized system of
arbitration that incorporates precise rules of procedure" such as NAFTA,
"it is clear that neither of these mechanisms could be altered by the
operation of the clause because these very specific provisions reflect the
precise will of the contracting parties.'' 169
The Tribunal also noted two more general public policy considerations. It
welcomed the "fact that the application of the most favored nation clause to
dispute settlement arrangements in the context of investment treaties might
result in the harmonization and enlargement of the scope of such
arrangements,' but it also worried about the possibility of "disruptive
treaty-shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of
underlying specific treaty provisions, on the other hand." 17 1 The Tribunal's
analysis of these public policy considerations came in for sharp criticism in
the Salini and Plama. cases, discussed below in Parts IV.F and IV.G,
respectively.
In explaining its central holding, the Tribunal placed particular
importance on the respective practices of Spain and Argentina in determining
the parties' intent as to whether the dispute settlement provisions of their BIT
could be modified by reference to the Spain-Chile BIT:
164. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 62, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 410 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.





170. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 62, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 410 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf
171. Id. para. 63,at410.
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The Claimant has convincingly explained that at the time of the negotiations of the
Agreement, Argentina still sought to require some form of prior exhaustion of local
remedies, while Spain supported the policy of a direct right of submission to arbitration,
which was reflected in the numerous agreements it negotiated with other countries at that
time.... Argentina later abandoned its prior policy, and like Spain and Chile, accepted
treaty clauses providing2 for the direct submission of disputes to arbitration following a
period of negotiations.
The Tribunal then described the typical Spanish practice of requiring a six
month negotiation period prior to arbitration but then leaving investors the
choice of resorting to arbitration or domestic courts, as well as its practice in a
few cases of providing for arbitration exclusively. The fact that the treaties
include different dispute resolution mechanisms (six, nine, or twelve month
negotiation periods followed by sometimes optional, sometimes mandatory
resort to arbitration) but were negotiated at the same time persuaded the
Tribunal that Spain did not consider the waiting period an important public
policy requirement.
One might wonder why the Tribunal did not conclude that the diversity
of dispute settlement mechanisms in Spain's BITs demonstrated that Spain did
not consider the MFN clause to apply to such provisions. The Spain-Chile and
Spain-Argentina BITs were concluded one day apart. There is indeed
something odd about the idea, implicit in the Tribunal's decision, that Spain
was simultaneously signing two treaties knowing that the provisions of one
treaty were less favorable and therefore would never actually be applied by
Spain. This seemingly odd behavior, however, is precisely what is required by
the MFN principle, at least since the abandonment of the conditional form of
the clause and the concomitant principle of material reciprocity. The MFN
principle requires Spain to treat all foreign investors equally, but it does not
require Argentina to treat Spanish investors the same way that Argentinean
investors are treated in Spain. A given BIT, therefore, establishes a floor for
treatment that corresponds to the less favorable treatment offered by the two
countries on any given issue at that specific point in time.
The Tribunal's discussion of state practice is rather puzzling.
Argentina's practice is irrelevant to the treatment to which an Argentinean
investor in Spain is entitled, which is the most favorable of (a) the Spain-
Argentina BIT, (b) Spain's other BITs, and (c) the treatment Spain affords its
own nationals in Spain. Spanish treaty practice with third countries is relevant
only as evidence that Spain did not have a policy of insisting on waiting
periods and therefore cannot argue that its consent to arbitration was
conditioned on compliance with the clause. More problematic, however, is the
Tribunal's reference to Spanish negotiating practice:
The Spanish treaty practice is also relevant in connection with another aspect of the
clause. Most treaties concluded by Spain have a model clause to the effect that... 'Each
Party shall guarantee in its territory fair and equitable treatment for the investments made
by investors of the other Party .... This treatment shall not be less favourable than that
extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by its own investors.. .'
[I While this clause applies to national treatment of foreign investors, it may also be
understood to embrace the treatment required by a Government for its investors abroad,
as evidenced by the treaties made to ensure their protection. Hence, if a Government
172. Id. para. 57, at410.
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seeks to obtain a dispute settlement method for its investors abroad, which is more
favorable than that granted under the basic treaty to foreign investors in its territory, the
clause may be construed so as to require a similar treatment of the latter.'73
This passage appears to conflate the requirements of the MFN clause with the
principle of material reciprocity, which is not implicated in the unconditional
MFN clause. The only circumstances in which Spain is required to accord
foreign investors the same treatment that it seeks for its own investors abroad
is when that treatment is either (a) enshrined in a treaty or (b) embodied in
Spanish law applicable to Spanish investors (assuming the foreign investor
benefits from a national treatment provision). Spain's negotiating position
does not, without a corresponding treaty provision that an investor may invoke
directly or through an MFN clause, create any legal obligations for Spain.
Moreover, the Tribunal's reference to national treatment is particularly
misplaced in the investment law context, for no country allows its own
nationals to pursue investment claims against it through international
arbitration; indeed in the ICSID context, such an oxymoronic practice is
expressly barred. 
174
The Tribunal's attempt to extend the concept of "national treatment"
extraterritorially is both unsound as a matter of principle and incompatible
with the text of the very clause the Tribunal quotes in support of it, which
refers to the treatment "extended by each Party to the investments made in its
territory by its own investors."' 175 In ordinary circumstances this new principle
would be redundant, since the same treatment could be claimed through the
MFN clause. 176 However, it could have a mischievous impact in at least one
scenario. Suppose the MFN clause in the Spain-Argentina BIT expressly
provided that it did not apply to dispute settlement mechanisms. Under the
Tribunal's expansive view of the national treatment requirement, an Argentine
investor could nevertheless claim an entitlement to proceed directly to
arbitration, a clear violation of the parties' intentions.
C. Yaung Chi O0 Trading v. Myanmar
177
The MFN clause was not central to this case and the argument based on
it appears to have been thrown in by the Claimant just in case. Nevertheless,
although the Tribunal dismissed the Claimant's argument, it did not appear to
173. Id. para. 61, at 409-10 (footnote omitted).
174. Article 25 of the iCSID Convention limits the jurisdiction of ICSID to "any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State . ..and a national of another
Contracting State."
175. Maffezini, para. 61, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) at 411-12, quoting ACUERDO PARA LA
PROMOCIN Y PROTECCION RECIPROCA DE INVERSIONES, Alg.-Spain, art. 4, Dec. 23, 1994,
5 Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties 1994, available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain-algeria sp.pdf (emphasis added).
176. It is theoretically possible to imagine a scenario in which Spain had a policy of seeking
access to arbitration for its investors but had never actually secured it for them through a treaty. In this
implausible scenario it would be extraordinary indeed to require Spain to gratuitously provide the very
treatment that its best efforts had been unable to secure for its own investors.
177. Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Myanmar, ASEAN Case No. ARB/01/I, Request for
Provisional Measures, 8 ICSID (W. Bank) 452 (2003).
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have any difficulty with the idea that an MFN clause could substitute for
consent to an entirely different arbitral forum.
The Tribunal, on its way to concluding that it lacked jurisdiction,
dismissed the Claimant's MFN argument in a single paragraph:
Subsidiarily, the Claimant argued that jurisdiction could be attracted on the basis of the
most-favoured nation clause contained in Article 8 of the Framework Agreement, read in
conjunction with the bilateral investment treaty between Myanmar and the Philippines
concluded on 17 February 1998. However Article IX of that Agreement provides for
arbitration of investment disputes pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules, with a different
appointing authority from the one designated in Article X of the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement. As the Tribunal pointed out in its Order No. 2, if a party wishes to rely on the
jurisdictional possibility affirmed by an ICSID Tribunal in Maffezini v. Kingdom of
Spain, it would normally be incumbent on it to rely on that possibility, and on the other
treaty in question, at the time of instituting the arbitral proceedings.'
78
This passage is nevertheless interesting in that it deals with one of the four
public policy exceptions enumerated in Maffezini, yet the Tribunal does not
appear to see any problem with the idea that an MFN clause could provide
access to a different arbitration forum than the one foreseen in the base
treaty-provided the Claimant chooses the forum when it initiates the arbitral
proceedings. The Tribunal may simply have failed to devote adequate
attention to an argument it considered tangential, but it is nonetheless
troubling that the Tribunal cites Maffezini as having affirmed a possibility that
Maffezini in fact specifically rejected.179
D. Tecmed v. Mexico
180
As in Yaung Chi Qo, the MFN issue was not of central importance in
Tecmed; in fact, it was raised only in oral arguments and was summarily
dismissed by the Tribunal. Yet the Tribunal's passing reference may have
broader implications in that it repeats a variant of the argument, drawn from
Haratzi and Grotius and discussed in Asian Agricultural Products, to the
effect that specifically negotiated provisions could not be modified by an
MFN clause. As noted above, a dispute over an MFN clause is an entirely
inappropriate context in which to invoke the interpretive principle according
to which specific provisions trump general ones, because it would lead to an
exceedingly narrow scope for MFN clauses-so narrow as to vitiate the very
purpose of MFN clauses.
The Claimant in Tecmed sought retroactive application of a treaty on the
grounds that absent such application the investor would be receiving less
favorable treatment than a similarly situated Austrian investor. The Tribunal
noted the claimant's reference to Maffezini but refused to consider the
Austrian treaty:
178. Id. para. 83, at 487 (footnote omitted).
179. See Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 63, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 410 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
180. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 43 I.L.M. 133 (2003),
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Tecnicas-Mexico-Award-29May203-Eng.pdf.
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The Arbitral Tribunal will not examine the provisions of such Treaty in detail in light of
such principle, because it deems that matters relating to the application over time of the
Agreement, which involve more the time dimension of application of its substantive
provisions rather than matters of procedure or jurisdiction, due to their significance and
importance, go to the core of matters that must be deemed to be specifically negotiated by
the Contracting Parties. These are determining factors for their acceptance of the
Agreement, as they are directly linked to the identification of the substantive protection
regime applicable to the foreign investor and, particularly, to the general (national or
international) legal context within which such regime operates, as well as to the access of
the foreign investor to the substantive provisions of such regime. Their application cannot
therefore be impaired by the principle contained in the most favored nation clause.
181
This treatment of the MFN issue is strange for several reasons. First, hitherto,
the application of the MFN principle to substantive provisions has never been
seen as problematic. The core purpose of the MFN clause is to ensure
substantive equality in the treatment of investors of different nationalities, and
as the cases discussed here abundantly illustrate, the more problematic
question has always been whether the MFN clause also applies to procedural
and jurisdictional questions. Consequently, the Tribunal's distinction of
Tecmed from Maffezini as presenting a substantive question rather than a
procedural or jurisdictional one does not support the Tribunal's conclusion
that the MFN clause is inapplicable.
Second, the Tribunal compounds this error by asserting that matters
"deemed to be specifically negotiated by the Contracting Parties '82 cannot be
modified through the operation of the MFN clause. The Tribunal's view that
any provisions related to the "substantive protection regime" constitute
"determining factors for their acceptance of the Agreement' is inconsistent
with the purpose and normal operation of the MFN clause. As the history of
the MFN clause indicates, the aim of an unconditional MFN clause is to
prevent two states from specially negotiating provisions that they are
unwilling to apply to others. In Siemens, Argentina sought to invoke Teemed
for this strange proposition, 184 but the Tribunal in Siemens correctly rejected
this argument, because "[i]n fact, the purpose of the MFN clause is to
eliminate the effect of specially negotiated provisions unless they have been
excepted."'85
Although the Tribunal's analysis turns the MFN clause inside-out, its
specific conclusion-that the Claimant could not secure retroactive
application of its BIT through the MFN clause-is nonetheless correct, albeit
for different reasons. International law contains a strong presumption against
the retroactive application of treaties. This presumption is codified in Article
28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.' 86 The question here,
therefore, is whether or not a "different intention" could be "otherwise
181. Id. para. 69, at 147.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 50
(2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision-en.pdf.
185. Id. para. 106.
186. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 28, at 339 ("Unless a different intention appears
from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact
which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the
treaty with respect to that party.").
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established" through an MFN clause and a third-party treaty. It is highly
doubtful, although perhaps not impossible, that such an intention could be
established in this way. The fact that the MFN clause itself is contained in the
very treaty whose retroactive application is sought would make such an
argument depend on a form of chronological bootstrapping that few if any
tribunals would be likely to accept.
E. Siemens v. Argentina
187
The Siemens case was in many respects a repeat of Maffezini and
reinforced its interpretive approach by applying the same reasoning even in a
case in which the MFN clause was less broadly-worded than in Maffezini. As
in Maffezini, the case involved an Argentinean BIT with a waiting period for
domestic litigation, a claimant who sought to avoid application of the clause
by reference to a third-party treaty with Chile, and a conclusion by the
Tribunal that dispute settlement provisions were within the scope of the MFN
clause. The principal difference-apart from the fact that Argentina was now
the respondent rather than the home state of the claimant-was that the
wording of the applicable MFN clause in the Germany-Argentina BIT was
less explicitly broad in scope. Argentina vigorously urged this distinction
upon the Tribunal, but without success:
The Tribunal notes that the MFN clause in the Spain BIT refers to 'all matters subject to
this Agreement', while the MFN clause in the Treaty refers only to 'treatment'. The
arbitral tribunal in Maffezini noted that Spain had used the expression 'all matters subject
to this Agreement' only in the case of its BIT with Argentina and 'this treatment' in all
other cases. The said tribunal commented that the latter was 'of course a narrower
formulation'. The Tribunal concurs that the formulation is narrower but, as concluded
above, it considers that the term 'treatment' and the phrase 'activities related to the
investments' are sufficiently wide to include settlement of disputes.'
88
The wording of the clause thus presented a distinction without a difference.
While the outcome and rationale is largely the same as in Maffezini, the
Siemens Tribunal provides a more extensive explanation of the methodology
and rationale of its decision. It begins its analysis with the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties:
The Tribunal considers that the Treaty has to be interpreted neither liberally nor
restrictively, as neither of these adverbs is part of Article 3 l(1) of the Vienna Convention.
The Tribunal shall be guided by the purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title and
preamble. It is a treaty 'to protect' and 'to promote' investments. The preamble provides
that the parties have agreed to the provisions of the Treaty for the purpose of creating
favorable conditions for the investments of nationals or companies of one of the two
States in the territory of the other State. Both parties recognize that the promotion and
protection of these investments by a treaty may stimulate private economic initiative and
increase the well-being of the peoples of both countries. The intention of the parties is
187. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision-en.pdf.
188. Id. para. 103. The reference "as concluded above" is to para. 85, where the Tribunal
concluded that "[tireatment in Article 3 refers to treatment under the Treaty in general and not only
under that Article."
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clear. It is to create favorable conditions for investments and to stimulate private
initiative. 89
The Tribunal thus expressly anchors its holding in its understanding that
the purpose of the treaty as a whole is to "protect" and "promote" investments.
While this is not wrong in itself, one must be wary of placing too much weight
on such statements of purpose in BITs, for doing so could lead tribunals to
resolve all doubtful questions in favor of investors on the theory that better
protection for investors will always be more in keeping with the "purpose" of
the treaty. Moreover, while the treaty as a whole may have one purpose, a
specific provision may have a separate purpose which is of equal importance
to one or both contracting parties-for example, preserving the integrity and
core functions of the domestic court system. It is thus important, as Article
31(1) of the Vienna Convention states, to consider the context as well as the
purpose.
The Tribunal next considers the parties' conflicting interpretations of
Anglo-Iranian Oil, Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco, and Ambatielos. The
Tribunal distinguishes Anglo-Iranian Oil on the ground that "[a]s stated by the
I.C.J. itself, it is clear that the I.C.J. did not consider the 'meaning or scope of
the MFN clause,' including whether the clause would extend to settlement of
disputes."' 190 As noted in the discussion of this case above, this is not quite
accurate, for the Tribunal ignores the fact that on the very next page of its
opinion, in response to what it saw as a different argument, the I.C.J. did
consider the scope and meaning of the clause and concluded "that the most-
favoured-nation clause in the Treaties of 1857 and 1903 between Iran and the
United Kingdom has no relation whatever to the jurisdictional matters
between the two Govemments."'
' 91
Anglo-Iranian Oil is the outlier of the three cases in that it was the only
one to reject the applicability of the MFN clause to a jurisdictional matter, and
since all three were decided within one year of each other, the difference
would not appear to be attributable to a change in the views or composition of
the I.C.J. The pivotal factor in the case was the Iranian Declaration, because in
accordance with its terms, Iran had not consented to the jurisdiction of the
I.C.J. for disputes with the United Kingdom. At issue was not the terms or
timing of the United Kingdom's right to bring a dispute with Iran before the
I.C.J., but rather the existence of that right at all. To find an analogous
situation in the contemporary investment context, one would have to imagine
a situation in which the claimant's basic BIT contained an MFN clause but no
arbitration clause, whereas a third-party BIT with the host state contained an
arbitration clause. It is unlikely that any tribunal would sustain its jurisdiction
in such a scenario. In fact, when a less extreme version of this scenario was
presented in the Plama case, discussed in detail, infra, the Tribunal declined
jurisdiction.
The Tribunal in Siemens found more support in the Rights of U.S.
Nationals in Morocco case, stating that "It is evident that the I.C.J. accepted
189. Id. para. 81 (footnote omitted).
190. Id. para. 96 (quoting Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 109 (July 22)).
191. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 110 (July 22).
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that MFN clauses may extend to provisions related to 9urisdictional matters,
but this was not really the issue between the parties."'  This is true, but it is
also true that the jurisdictional matters at issue were quite different from those
present in Siemens. The issue was whether or not U.S. consular courts could
continue to exercise jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters involving U.S.
nationals within Morocco. Thus the thorny questions related to the scope and
extent of a state's consent to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal-the
very questions at the heart of the dispute in Siemens and the other
contemporary cases-were simply not present.
Finally, the Tribunal considered the award of the Commission of
Arbitration in Ambatielos: "The Respondent has argued that, in Ambatielos,
administration of justice refers to substantive procedural rights like just and
equitable treatment and not to purely jurisdictional matters. The Tribunal does
not find any basis in the reasoning of the Commission to justify such
distinction."' 93 In the Tribunal's view, the rationale of Ambatielos applies a
fortiori in the BIT context:
On the other hand, the Tribunal finds that the Treaty itself, together with so many other
treaties of investment protection, has as a distinctive feature special dispute settlement
mechanisms not normally open to investors. Access to these mechanisms is part of the
protection offered under the Treaty. It is part of the treatment of foreign investors and
investments and of the advantages accessible through a MFN clause.'
94
After thus relying on Ambatielos for support for its decision, the Tribunal
noted as if in passing that, "This conclusion concurs with the findings of the
arbitral tribunal in Maffezini."' ' 95
The question of state practice was also raised, but as in Maffezini, the
inconsistency of Argentina's practice precluded an argument that its consent
to jurisdiction was premised on compliance with the domestic litigation
waiting period:
As to the claim that Article 10(2) reflects the policy of Argentina, the Respondent has not
presented any evidence beyond its affirmations to this effect in the written pleadings. The
Tribunal would consider an indication of the existence of a policy of the Respondent if a
certain requirement has been consistently included in similar treaties executed by the
Respondent. The Chile BIT was signed on August 2, 1991, only a few months before the
Treaty. The Spain BIT was entered into on October 3, 1991. The US-Argentina BIT,
which does not require institution of judicial proceedings prior to arbitration, was
executed on November 14, 1991. This lack of consistency among the BITs entered into
by the Respondent during the same year as the Treaty was signed does not support the
argument that the institution of proceedings before the local courts is a 'sensitive' issue of
economic or foreign policy or that it is an essential part of the consent of the Respondent
to arbitration. The Respondent has sought for its own nationals as investors in Chile or
the United States similar treatment to that sought by the Claimant in these proceedings.'
96
Notwithstanding the irrelevant reference to the treatment Argentina "has
sought for its own nationals as investors"-and the lack of evidence as to
192. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 99
(2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision-en.pdf.
193. Id. para. 102.
194. Id.
195. Id. para. 103.
196. Id. para. 105.
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whether Argentina sought such treatment or merely consented to it-the
analysis here is persuasive. The implication is that the host state's practice
will only provide a defense to an MFN-based claim in the rare circumstance in
which a state has been extraordinarily consistent in its practice, but for a
single treaty containing a more favorable provision. 197 For if a state's treaty
practice were consistent without exception, then no MFN issue could arise; if,
on the other hand, a state's practice on a given issue varies, then it is
precluded from arguing that any one position on that issue is a sensitive issue
of public policy. As Emmanuel Gaillard has suggested, one situation in which
this question is likely to arise in the coming years will be if and when China
abandons its steadfast practice of consenting to arbitration for the sole purpose
of determining the amount of compensation required as a result of an
expropriation. The first treaty to which China agrees that includes a broader
consent to arbitration will likely trigger a flood of MFN-based claims.
1 98
Tribunals addressing such claims would be well-advised not to place too
much weight on consistency of state practice. Instead, their jurisdictional
decisions will rest on firmer footing if they focus on the issue of consent,
following the implicit rationale of Anglo-Iranian Oil and Plama-which
involved an arbitration clause very similar to the one presently employed by
China.
Finally, the Tribunal in Siemens considered the question of whether a
claimant invoking third-party treaty provisions through an MFN clause must
import the third-party treaty's provisions as a whole or whether it may import
only the more beneficial terms in isolation from their context. In an analysis
that confuses the way an MFN clause operates, the Tribunal comes to the
rather startling conclusion that such cherry-picking is permissible:
As regards the issue of whether the claim of a benefit under an MFN clause triggers
application of the whole treaty, it depends on the terms of the clause, but only to the
extent that it is advantageous to the beneficiary of the clause. The MFN clause would be
of limited use otherwise. This understanding does not mean that the investor in Argentina
will enjoy a more favorable treatment than the investor in Chile. The MFN clause works
both ways. The investor in Chile will be able to claim similar benefits under the Chile
BIT.
[T]he Tribunal considers that, as a general matter, claiming a benefit by the
operation of an MFN clause does not carry with it the acceptance of all the terms of the
treaty which provides for such benefit whether or not they are considered beneficial to the
party making the claim; neither does it entail that the claiming party has access to all
benefits under such treaty. This will depend on the terms of the MFN clause and other
terms of the treaties involved. 99
The implication of this holding is that the German investor in Argentina is
permitted to claim the right of direct access to arbitration from the Argentina-
Chile BIT but without being bound by the fork-in-the-road provision, since
the Germany-Argentina BIT lacks such a provision. The result is to impose on
197. State practice would be much more relevant if the state practice in question was practice in
applying as opposed to negotiating the relevant treaty provisions. See Vienna Convention, supra note
64, art. 31(3). While the Vienna Convention does not say so explicitly, it seems that practice in applying
an identical provision in another treaty could also be illuminating.
198. Gaillard 2005, supra note 63, at 159-60.
199. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras.
108-09 (2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision-en.pdf.
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Argentina a combination of dispute settlement provisions to which Argentina
had never consented to grant to anyone. Moreover, while the Maffezini award
was of course not binding on the Tribunal in Siemens, it is worth bearing in
mind that the fork-in-the-road provision was one of the four types of
provisions which the Tribunal in Maffezini thought could not be circumvented
by an MFN clause,2°° yet the Tribunal here does not explain the basis for its
disagreement with Maffezini on this point.
The Tribunal explains its rejection of the idea that an investor must
import the dispute settlement mechanism as a whole, rather than only isolated
provisions, in the following terms:
This understanding of the operation of the MFN clause would defeat the intended result
of the clause which is to harmonize benefits agreed with a party with those considered
more favorable granted to another party. It would oblige the party claiming a benefit
under a treaty to consider the advantages and disadvantages of that treaty as a whole
rather than just the benefits. The Tribunal recognizes that there may be merit in the
proposition that, since a treaty has been negotiated as a package, for other parties to
benefit from it, they also should be subject to its disadvantages. The disadvantages may
have been a trade-off for the claimed advantages. However, this is not the meaning of an
MFN clause. As its own name indicates, it relates only to more favorable treatment.
There is also no correlation between the generality of the application of a particular
clause and the generality of benefits and disadvantages that the treaty concerned may
include. Even if the MFN clause is of a general nature, its application will be related only
to the benefits that the treaty of reference may grant and to the extent that benefits are
perceived to be such. As already noted, there may be public policy considerations that
limit the benefits that may be claimed by the operation of an MFN clause, but those
pleaded by the Respondent have not been considered by the Tribunal to be applicable in
this case.
20 1
The Tribunal here misunderstands both the operation of the MFN clause
and the import of its decision. It is neither precisely correct nor particularly
relevant for the Tribunal to assert that the "investor in Chile will be able to
claim similar benefits under the Chile BIT." Under the Tribunal's holding, it
would be true that the German investor in Chile could claim similar benefits
in both Argentina and Chile; however, we do not know whether Argentinean
investors in Chile, like their German counterparts, would be able to
circumvent the fork-in-the-road provision without looking at Chile's BIT with
Germany. 2° 2 In any event, the purpose of the MFN clause in the Germany-
Argentina BIT is not to ensure that German investors enjoy the same rights in
both Argentina and Chile but rather to ensure that German and Chilean
investors in Argentina are treated equally.
200. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 63, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 410 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf; see also supra note 16969 and accompanying text.
201. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, para. 120.
202. In fact, the 1991 Chile-Germany BIT did contain an eighteen-month domestic litigation
requirement analogous to that in the Argentina-Germany BIT, but of course no fork-in-the-road
provision, because a fork-in-the-road provision would contradict the waiting period provision. Chile-
F.R.G Investment Treaty, supra note 78, art. 10. Interestingly, the dispute settlement provisions were
modified by a 1997 protocol which allowed Chilean investors to proceed directly to arbitration but
retained the waiting period for German investors in Chile-subject to the proviso that "each Contracting
Party could offer more favorable treatment" ["cada Parte Contratante podrA ofrecer un trato mis
favorable"]. See Chile-F.R.G. Protocol and Supplement, supra note 78, arts. 1,4.
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It is true, however, that under the Tribunal's view, both Chilean and
German investors in Argentina could claim entitlement to arbitration without a
fork-in-the-road-thus the non-discrimination principle is respected. The
problem is that the treatment required is not the most favorable treatment
accorded by Argentina, but in fact more favorable treatment than it has agreed
to accord anyone-and Argentina is now obliged to grant this extra-favorable
treatment to investors from any country with whom it has a BIT containing an
MFN clause. The result of the widespread application of this view could only
be chaos and a legitimate sense of injustice on the part of host states.
The difficulty is in finding a satisfactory middle point between requiring
the importation of an entire treaty on the one hand, and allowing claimants to
cherry pick individual provisions-or even words or phrases-out of context.
A variant of the ejusdem generis principle may be of some use here as a
limiting principle that would allow a claimant to import a set of related
provisions-for example, the entire dispute-settlement mechanism-from
another treaty, but without being obliged to import the entire treaty. Tribunals
will then be faced with the potentially difficult task of determining which
provisions are sufficiently related that they must be imported together or not at
all, but these difficulties are modest in comparison to those which would
result from unlimited provision-by-provision treaty shopping. A further
implication is that claimants wishing to take advantage of more favorable
dispute settlement provisions in other treaties must be careful to avoid
foreclosing this option. In this case, for example, Siemens had to make a
strategic choice at the outset of whether to bring an action in local courts in
order to toll the waiting period in the Germany-Argentina BIT or to forego the
court action in order to comply with the fork-in-the-road provision of the
Chile-Argentina BIT.
F. Salini v. Jordan
20 3
After Maffezini and Siemens, it may have appeared that proponents of a
broad reading of the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement
mechanisms were on their way to winning the day. Salini, however, was the
first case to reject such application, and when read against the backdrop of the
previous cases, it suggests that the specific terms of the treaty in question as
well as the factual circumstances in which the MFN claim arises are more
important than any general principle of giving MFN clauses a "broad" or
"narrow" scope.
The case involved a dispute over the final payment due to two Italian
companies following completion of the construction of the Karameh Dam in
Jordan. Article 9 of the Jordan-Italy BIT provided for ICSID arbitration of
disputes concerning treaty violations, but it also provided that, where an
investment was made pursuant to an investment contract, the contractual
203. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction,
44 I.L.M. 573 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/salini-decision.pdf (reproduced
in part).
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dispute settlement procedures would govern. 20 4 The dam project was subject
to an investment contract that required disputes to be settled in Jordanian
courts unless the parties agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration. 205 The
Italian claimants nevertheless sought to bring their contractual claims before
an ICSID tribunal on the theory that Jordan's BITs with the United States and
other countries allowed investors from such countries to bring contractual
claims to arbitration, and therefore that the MFN clause entitled Italian
investors to do likewise. The Tribunal rejected this argument, holding that it
lacked jurisdiction over contractual claims, but that it would have jurisdiction
over claims based on breaches of the treaty itself.
Two provisions of the Jordan-Italy BIT were central to the Tribunal's
decision. First was the MFN provision included in Articles 3(1) and (2):
I. Both Contracting Parties, within the bounds of their own territory, shall grant
investments effected by, and the income accruing to, investors of the other Contracting
Party, no less favourable treatment than that accorded to investments effected by, and
income accruing to, its own nationals or investors of Third States.
2. In case, from the legislation of one of the Contracting Parties, or from the international
obligations in force or that may come into force in the future for one of the Contracting
Parties, should come out a legal framework according to which the investors of the other
Contracting Party would be granted a more favourable treatment than the one foreseen in
this Agreement, the treatment granted to the investors of such other Parties will apply
also for outstanding relationships. 0 6
Second was Article 9(2), which provided that "'[i]n case the investor and an
entity of the Contracting Parties have stipulated an investment Agreement, the
procedure foreseen in such investment agreement shall apply."' 2
07
The Tribunal sought to distinguish these provisions from the ones at
issue in Ambatielos and Maffezini:
The Tribunal observes that the circumstances of this case are different [than in Maffezini
and Ambatielos]. Indeed, Article 3 of the BIT between Italy and Jordan does not include
any provision extending its scope of application to dispute settlement. It does not
envisage 'all rights or all matters covered by the agreement'. Furthermore, the Claimants
have submitted nothing from which it might be established that the common intention of
the Parties was to have the most-favored-nation clause apply to dispute settlement. Quite
on the contrary, the intention as expressed in Article 9(2) of the BIT was to exclude from
ICSID jurisdiction contractual disputes between an investor and an entity of a State Party
in order that such disputes might be settled in accordance with the procedures set forth in
the investment agreements. Lastly, the Claimants have not cited any practice in Jordan or
Italy in support of their claims.
From this, the Tribunal concludes that Article 3 of the BIT does not apply insofar
as dispute settlement clauses are concerned.
208
204. Id. para. 66, at 584 (quoting Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Italy-Jordan, art. 9, July 21, 1996, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
italy-jordan.pdf).
205. Id. para. 71, at 586.
206. Id. para. 104, at 591 (quoting Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Italy-Jordan, art. 3 §§1-2, July 21, 1996, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
italy-jordan.pdf).
207. Id. para. 70, at 585 (quoting Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Italy-Jordan, art. 9, §2, July 21, 1996, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/italy-jordan.pdf).
208. Id. paras. 118-19, at 592.
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There is somewhat less to this distinction than meets the eye. First, the MFN
clauses in Ambatielos and Maffezini did not expressly extend to dispute
settlement, nor did the claimants in those cases submit any evidence-other
than arguments based on the text and purpose-in their efforts to show that
the parties' intention was to give the MFN clause a broad scope limited only
by the subject matter of the treaty. In support of its statement, the Tribunal
refers to the emphasis in Maffezini on Spanish treaty practice, but this is not
evidence of Spain's intent to have the MFN clause apply to dispute settlement
provisions, but rather evidence of the existence or lack of a Spanish public
policy that would act as a bar to such application.
On this point, therefore, the difference is not related to the circumstances
of the cases but rather to the tribunals' respective starting points: In Maffezini
the Tribunal presumed that an expansively worded MFN clause was intended
to apply broadly, absent limiting language or a compelling argument for a
contrary intention; whereas in Salini the Tribunal starts from the presumption
that the MFN clause does not apply unless it can be specifically demonstrated
that the parties intended it to apply to the specific issue in question. The MFN
clause is by its very nature a general provision, for as one commentator writes,
"The parties to a treaty containing the clause do not know in what way, or
when, a country will be most favored. All that these parties do know is that
they must generalize concessions granted to any third country." 20 9 Since most
MFN clauses only refer to "treatment" without further specification, Salini's
restrictive approach would essentially read those clauses out of existence.
Second, it is at least arguable whether much weight can be placed on the
presence or absence of terms such as "all rights" or "all matters." Article 3(2)
refers to "treatment granted to the investors," and in Siemens, which was
decided just three months before Salini,2 1 the Tribunal found that "the term
'treatment' is so general that the Tribunal cannot limit its application except as
specifically agreed by the parties '211 and accordingly "it considers that the
term 'treatment' and the phrase 'activities related to the investments' are
sufficiently wide to include settlement of disputes. 2t 2
The only clear distinction between the cases, therefore, is the presence in
this case of Article 9(2). This distinction is fundamental, although not for the
reason given by the Tribunal. For while it is true that this provision clearly
establishes the parties' intent at the time of the BIT as to how contractual
disputes were to be handled, it does not, on its own, tell us anything about the
parties' intentions as to whether the provision could be modified through the
MFN clause. In Maffezini, the Spain-Argentina BIT clearly established the
parties' intention that an eighteen-month domestic litigation period was
required before arbitration could be initiated, yet the Tribunal held that this
209. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 13 (footnote omitted).
210. There is no reference to the Siemens case in the Salini decision. See generally Salini
Costruttori S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44 1.L.M. 573
(2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/salini-decision.pdf (reproduced in part).
211. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, para.
106 (2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-decision-en.pdf
212. Id. para. 103.
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clearly intended requirement could be altered through the operation of the
MFN clause.
However, although Article 9(2) does not tell us anything about the scope
of the MFN clause, it tells us a great deal about the scope of Jordan's consent
to arbitration with Italian investors. Simply put, Article 9(2) establishes that
Jordan has not consented to the arbitration of contractual disputes with Italian
investors. As the I.C.J. observed in Ambatielos, "the question is whether the
consent given by the Parties ... to arbitrate a certain category of disputes[]
does or does not extend to the [claimant's] claim." 213 Article 9(2) answers this
question in the negative, and as the I.C.J. held in Anglo-Iranian Oil, a clear
provision excluding certain disputes from a state's consent to jurisdiction
cannot be circumvented through an MFN clause and a third-party treaty. The
outcome in Salini is justified, therefore, not on the basis of the Tribunal's
presumption that MFN clauses do not apply to dispute settlement
mechanisms, but rather because of the fundamental rule of international law
that the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is based on consent.
While this line of reasoning would have provided a solid justification for
the outcome reached in Salini, the Tribunal instead chose to challenge the
basis of Maffezini, because "The current Tribunal shares the concerns that
have been expressed in numerous quarters with regard to the solution adopted
in the Maffezini case. Its fear is that the precautions taken by authors of the
award may in practice prove difficult to apply, thereby adding more
uncertainties to the risk of "treaty shopping." 214 While these pragmatic
concerns are both legitimate and important, it is not clear on what basis the
Tribunal injects these concerns into its interpretation of the Italy-Jordan BIT
in the form of a presumption that MFN clauses do not apply to dispute
settlement provisions. Moreover, in its challenge to Maffezini, the Tribunal
misrepresents in some respects both Maffezini and the Ambatielos decision on
which it largely relied.
As to Ambatielos, the Tribunal here sought to distinguish it as an attempt
to import substantive, rather than procedural provisions:
The Tribunal will observe that in this [Ambatielos] case, Greece invoked the most-
favored-nation clause with a view to securing, for one of its nationals, not the application
of a dispute settlement clause, but the application of substantive provisions in treaties
between the United Kingdom and several other countries under which their nationals
were to be treated 'in accordance with' 'justice', 'right' and 'equity'. 215
This description of Ambatielos ignores the fact that the Commission of
Arbitration did not acknowledge any substance/procedure distinction but
simply held that "the administration of justice," when viewed in connection
with the protection of the rights of traders, was within the scope of the MFN
clause. It is not clear that there is any meaningful distinction between a
"dispute settlement" provision and a provision concerning the "administration
213. Ambatielos Arbitration (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83, 107 (Comm'n of Arb. 1956).
214. Salini, para. 115, 44 I.L.M. at 592
215. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 112, 44 I.L.M. 569, 592 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/salini-
decision.pdf.
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of justice concerning the rights of investors." Moreover, the basis of the claim
in Ambatielos was that the procedures followed in the British court
proceedings had violated justice, right and equity,216 so it would be difficult to
sustain a distinction premised on the difference between "substantive" and
"procedural" provisions.
Next, the Tribunal incorrectly asserted that the Tribunal in Maffezini had
"found that, by operation of the most-favored-nation clause, the claimant
could avoid having first to exhaust domestic remedies." 217 In fact, the
Tribunal in Maffezini rejected the possibility that an MFN clause could enable
a claimant to avoid a requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. 218 The
question, however, did not arise in Maffezini, because the Spain-Argentina
BIT "does not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies as that concept is
understood in international law," but merely envisions a first bite at the apple
for domestic courts. 219 This mischaracterization may be the result of mere
sloppy drafting, but it certainly has the effect of making Maffezini appear to
have more far-reaching consequences than it actually does.
G. Plama v. Bulgaria
220
If Salini applied the brakes to the idea that MFN clauses should be
interpreted as being presumptively applicable to dispute settlement provisions,
then the Tribunal in Plama sought to reverse course, arguing in favor of a
presumptively narrow interpretation of MFN clauses.
The dispute in Plama concerned Bulgarian authorities' treatment of an
oil refinery in Bulgaria that was owned by a Cyprus corporation. The claimant
sought to resolve the dispute through international arbitration rather than
through the Bulgarian courts, but the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT was negotiated in
1987, when Bulgaria was still under communist rule, and did not generally
provide for disputes to be resolved through international arbitration. The BIT
allowed for arbitration (a) only after the domestic legal system had concluded
that an expropriation had occurred and (b) only to resolve a dispute as to the
amount of compensation due to the claimant. Such disputes about the amount
of compensation could be brought either before a domestic court or an
"international 'Ad Hoc' Arbitration Court.", 22 1 The claimant nevertheless
sought access to ICSID arbitration by way of the MFN clause.
216. In particular, Ambatielos objected to the fact that the trial court had permitted the U.K.
government to withhold certain evidence and that, when the evidence later became available, the
appellate court refused to allow Ambatielos to submit the evidence. See Ambatielos Arbitration (Greece
v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83, 100 (Comm'n ofArb. 1956).
217. Salini para. 113, 44 I.L.M. at 592.
218. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 63, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 410 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
219. Id. para. 28, at 401-02.
220. Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44
I.L.M. 721 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-decision.pdf.
221. Id. para. 26 (quoting Agreement on Mutual Encouragement and Protection of Investments,
Bulg.-Cyprus, art. 4.1, Nov. 12, 1987, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/does/
bits/bulgariascyprus.pdf). In full, the BIT provides:
The legality of the expropriation shall be checked at the request of the concerned investor
through the regular administrative and legal procedure of the contracting party that had taken the
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The MFN clause, similar to those at issue in Siemens and Salini,
provided that, "Each Contracting Party shall apply to the investments in its
territory by investors of the other Contracting Party a treatment which is not
less favorable than that accorded to investments by investors of third
states." 222 The Tribunal, after accepting jurisdiction over claims based on the
Energy Charter Treaty, rejected jurisdiction over claims based on the BIT,
concluding that "the MFN provision of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT cannot be
interpreted as providing consent to submit a dispute ... to ICSID arbitration
and that the Claimant cannot rely on dispute settlement provisions in other
BITs to which Bulgaria is a Contracting Party in the present case., 223 In light
of the extreme, if not unusual provisions of the BIT,224 this outcome is not
surprising; however, the Tribunal couched its decision in unnecessarily
sweeping terms, including a wholesale denunciation of Maffezini.
Before turning to more general principles, the Tribunal first engaged in
the task of interpreting the treaty itself, invoking Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention. As to the ordinary meaning of the MFN clause, the Tribunal
acknowledged that:
It is not clear whether the ordinary meaning of the term 'treatment' in the MFN provision
of the BIT includes or excludes dispute settlement provisions contained in other BITs to
which Bulgaria is a Contracting Party. Inclusion or exclusion may or may not satisfy the
ejusdem generis principle ... , but as it will be seen below, it is not relevant to address
that question.
225
The Tribunal found the context to be similarly un-illuminating:
The 'context' may support the Claimant's interpretation since the MFN provision is set
forth amongst the Treaty's provisions relating to substantive investment protection.
However, the context alone, in light of the other elements of interpretation considered
herein, does not persuade the Tribunal that the parties intended such an interpretation.
And the Tribunal has no evidence before it of the negotiating history of the BIT to
convince it otherwise. 226
Finally, the Tribunal considered the object and purpose:
The object and purpose of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT are: "the creation of favourable
conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the
other Contracting Party."... The Claimant also points to the Maffezini decision in which
it is observed: "dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the protection
offoreign investors, as they are also related to the protection of rights of traders under
treaties of commerce." Such statements are as such undeniable in their generality, but
expropriation steps. In cases of dispute with regard to the amount of the compensation, which disputes
were not settled in an administrative order, the concerned investor and the legal representatives of the
other Contracting Party shall hold consultations for fixing this value. If within 3 months after the
beginning of the consultations no agreement is reached, the amount of the compensation at the request
of the concerned investor shall be checked either in a legal regular procedure of the Contracting Party
which had taken the measure on expropriation or by an international 'Ad Hoc' Arbitration Court.
222. Id. para. 26, at 726.
223. Id. para. 227, at 756.
224. Apparently a similar provision is routinely included in China's BITs. See Gaillard 2005,
supra note 63, at 159-60.
225. Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 189, 44 I.L.M. 721, 750 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-
decision.pdf.
226. Id. Para. 192, at 750-51.
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they are legally insufficient to conclude that the Contracting Parties to the Bulgaria-
Cyprus BIT intended to cover by the MFN provision agreements to arbitrate in other
treaties to which Bulgaria (and Cyprus for that matter) is a Contracting Party. Here, the
Tribunal is mindful of Sir Ian Sinclair's warning of the 'risk that the placing of undue
emphasis on the 'object and purpose' of a treaty will encourage teleological methods of
interpretation [which], in some of its more extreme forms, will even deny the relevance of
the intentions of the parties.'
227
The Tribunal thus found the Treaty itself to be inconclusive as to the intention
of the parties, so it looked to circumstantial evidence for support for its
conclusion that the parties did not intend the MFN clause to apply to dispute
settlement provisions. In particular, it relied on two pieces of evidence. First,
at the time of the original BIT, communist Bulgaria had a policy of favoring
"bilateral investment treaties with limited protections for foreign investors and
with very limited dispute resolution provisions." 228 This is correct, but it does
not tell us anything about the parties' intentions regarding the MFN clause. As
discussed, supra, one of the benefits of an MFN clause is that it allows a given
state to effect a general change in policy without needing to renegotiate all of
its BITs.
Next, the Tribunal referred to negotiations between Bulgaria and Cyprus
aimed at revising the BIT:
Bulgaria and Cyprus negotiated a revision of their BIT in 1998. The negotiations failed
but specifically contemplated a revision of the dispute settlement provisions .... It can
be inferred from these negotiations that the Contracting Parties to the BIT themselves did
not consider that the MFN provision extends to dispute settlement provisions in other
BITs.
229
This inference seems entirely unwarranted. There is, to be sure, something
peculiar about negotiating treaty revisions in the shadow of MFN clauses, and
the Tribunal here fails to grasp the nature of the undertaking. The states are
essentially negotiating about a predictable, clearly enforceable, minimum
standard of treatment applicable in their bilateral relations, a standard that
does not depend on the existence of any third-party treaty.
If the Tribunal's inference were correct, states whose BITs contained
MFN clauses would revise them in only two circumstances: (1) to negotiate
terms more favorable than any previously granted by the host state, or (2) to
modify provisions to which the MFN clause does not apply. In the real world,
however, states do periodically renegotiate BITs. In fact, no fewer than 85
BITs had been renegotiated by the end of 2004.230 The UNCTAD World
Investment Report for 2005 indicated a number of reasons for such
renegotiations. Many BITs are limited in time and therefore expire after a
given period of years. In other cases, states wish to clarify or expand existing
commitments in light of intervening practice. The report noted in particular
that:
227. Id. para. 193, at 751 (quoting IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 131 (2d ed., 1984)) (italics in original).
228. Id. para. 196, at 751.
229. Id. para. 195, at 751.
230. UNCTAD, World Investment Report, supra note 37, at 26.
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[S]ome recent BITs have made significant innovations regarding investor-State dispute
settlement procedures, in an effort to secure greater transparency in arbitral proceedings,
including open hearings, publication of related legal documents and the possibility for
representatives of civil society to submit 'amicus curiae' (i.e. 'friends of the court') briefs
to arbitral tribunals. In addition, other very detailed provisions on investor-state dispute
settlement are included in order to provide for more legally oriented, predictable and
orderly conduct at the different stages of the ISDS process.
Investors undertaking risky investments no doubt value the clarity and
predictability that an updated BIT can provide, and states may also value these
features. In addition, as demonstrated in Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco,
relying solely on provisions in a third-party treaty makes one's rights
vulnerable to an abrogation or renegotiation of a third-party treaty. In any
event, contrary to the Tribunal's inference here, the mere fact that negotiations
occurred does not permit us to draw any clear inferences about the parties'
beliefs as to the scope and meaning of their existing MFN clause.
The Tribunal also addresses the question of intent from another
direction. In the Tribunal's view, the Maffezini "interpretation went beyond
what State Parties to BITs generally intended to achieve by an MFN provision
in a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty." 232 As evidence for this
proposition, the Tribunal refers to the specific exclusion of the Maffezini view
in a footnote the United States proposed to the draft of the Free Trade Area of
233the Americas. The Tribunal also notes the contrary British practice, but
does not explain why a provision sought by the United States better represents
"what State Parties to BITs generally intended to achieve" than does an
exactly opposite provision sought by the United Kingdom. If anything, the
British clause's emphasis on the fact that the specificity of its provision is
included "for the avoidance of doubt" does not suggest that the United
Kingdom believes it is derogating from the normal rule, but rather that it
wants to ensure that the provision will be interpreted correctly. Likewise, the
footnote in question emphasized that the MFN clause in the FTAA was more
narrowly worded than the one at issue in Maffezini and therefore "could not
reasonably lead to a conclusion similar to that of the Maffezini case." 23 4 Thus,
rather than supporting any presumption, both the United States and the United
Kingdom seek to ensure that the interpretation which they believe naturally
follows from the wording of their MFN clauses be given effect by a Tribunal.
Whatever the merits of the Tribunal's attempts to discern-or impute-
the parties' intent, the question of intent does not seem central to the outcome.
The Tribunal found another consideration to be "equally, if not more
important,"'235 to wit, the "well-established principle, both in domestic and
international law, that such an agreement [to arbitrate] should be clear and
unambiguous" and that "[d]oubts as to the parties' clear and unambiguous
231. Id. at 27 (italics in original).
232. Plama Consortium Ltd v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 203, 44 I.L.M. 721, 753 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-
decision.pdf.
233. See id. para. 202, at 752.
234. Id.
235. /d.para. 198, at751.
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intention can arise if the agreement to arbitrate is to be reached by
236incorporation by reference" through an MFN provision.
The Tribunal is here on a more promising track, but it has not identified
the precise principle at stake. At least as a matter of domestic law, the doctrine
that an agreement to arbitrate must be clear and unambiguous stems from the
fact that such an agreement amounts to a waiver of the right the parties would
otherwise enjoy of bringing any claims before a court. 237 This doctrine
obviously does not transpose easily to the context of an international
investment arbitration, where arbitration is typically included as an additional
option available to claimants who, at least until the moment when they initiate
an arbitration and thereby trigger a fork-in-the-road provision, retain their
right to pursue the claim in domestic courts.
From the point of view of the host state, however, an agreement to
arbitrate in a BIT constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to
the jurisdiction of a forum that would otherwise be without power to issue a
judgment binding on the host state. Moreover, since claimants' consent to
jurisdiction is given by the filing of a claim, the crucial question in
determining a tribunal's jurisdiction is whether the dispute falls within the
host state's consent to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The question is similar
to, but narrower than, the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate is
clear and unambiguous, and it makes Plama an easy case: Bulgaria never
consented to the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal over disputes with investors
from Cyprus.
This conclusion is supported by the Chorzow case, where the Permanent
Court held that:
[Since its jurisdiction was based on consent, the Court could] only affirm its jurisdiction
provided that the force of the arguments militating in favour of it is preponderant. The
fact that weighty arguments can be advanced to support the contention that it has no
jurisdiction cannot of itself create a doubt calculated to upset its jurisdiction. When
considering whether it has jurisdiction or not, the Court's aim is always to ascertain
whether an intention on the part of the Parties exists to confer jurisdiction upon it.
238
A comparison of Siemens and Maffezini on the one hand with Plama and
Salini on the other is instructive. In the former cases, there was no doubt about
the host country's consent to ICSID jurisdiction; the question was whether or
not a complainant had to comply with the 18-month domestic litigation
requirement prior to initiating arbitral proceedings. In Salini, Jordan had
consented to ICSID jurisdiction over treaty claims, but expressly excluded
contractual claims from the scope of its consent; in Plama, Bulgaria never
consented to ICSID jurisdiction for any dispute with Cyprus investors.
236. Id. paras. 198-99, at 752.
237. See, e.g., Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 814 A.2d 1098, 1104, 1106 (N.J. 2003) (noting that
"to be enforceable ... in New Jersey, a waiver-of-rights provision must reflect that an employee has
agreed clearly and unambiguously to arbitrate the disputed claim" and concluding that "the record as a
whole does not demonstrate that plaintiff had surrendered his statutory rights [to sue] knowingly and
voluntarily, which remains the critical inquiry").
238. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 9, at 32 (July 29), available
at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow/.
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A further problem with the Tribunal's approach is its use of "incorporate
by reference" analysis. Such analysis is inapposite, because-as its name
suggests-it applies to circumstances in which one treaty or contract makes
reference to a specific treaty or contract, as was the case in Ceskoslovenska
Obchodni Banka A.S. v. The Slovak Republic.239 As the Tribunal correctly
points out, in Rights of US. Nationals in Morocco, the I.C.J. had expressly
ruled out this sort of incorporation by reference analysis for MFN clauses as
being manifestly inconsistent with the intent of the parties.240 The purpose of
an MFN clause is not to incorporate by reference any specific provision of any
other treaty. Rather, "the intention of the most-favoured-nation clauses was to
establish and to maintain at all times fundamental equality without
discrimination among all of the countries concerned. 2 41 Instead of resting its
opinion in large part on this inapposite analysis, the Tribunal would have been
on much surer ground had it focused instead on the issue of consent.
The Tribunal also raised a number of other objections to the application
of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions. First, the Tribunal noted:
[T]he difficulty of applying an objective test to the issue of what is more favorable. The
Claimant argues that it is obviously more favorable for the investor to have a choice
among different dispute resolution mechanisms, and to have the entire dispute resolved
by arbitration as provided in the Bulgaria-Finland BIT, than to be confined to ad hoc
arbitration limited to the quantum of compensation for expropriation. The Tribunal is
inclined to agree with the Claimant that in this particular case, a choice is better than no
choice. But what if one BIT provides for UNCITRAL arbitration and another provides
for ICSID? Which is more favorable?
242
One wonders, however, whether this dilemma is not more apparent than real.
Claimants will inevitably have some reason for seeking to import provisions
from another treaty-for example, the answer to the Tribunal's rhetorical
question might be that in most cases ICSID arbitration is more favorable,
because an ICSID award is more easily enforced. However, as suggested
above, a better approach to that particular hypothetical case would be to
determine whether the host state had consented to arbitrate with investors
from that state in the forum sought by the claimant. This also answers the
second difficulty raised by the Tribunal, that is, whether or not one dispute
settlement mechanism (ad hoc arbitration) could be replaced with an entirely
different one.
243
The Tribunal also contested the assertion by the Tribunal in Maffezini
that giving a broad scope to the MFN clause would facilitate the
"harmonization" of such arrangements, noting that:
239. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 330 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
csob...decision.pdf, discussed in Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision
on Jurisdiction, para. 211, 44 I.L.M. 721, 753-54 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/plama-decision.pdf.
240. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (U.S. v. Fr.), 1952 I.C.J.
176, 191-92 (Aug. 27).
241. Id. at 192.
242. Plama, para. 208, 44 I.L.M. at 753.
243. Id. para. 209, at 753.
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[A]n investor has the option to pick and choose provisions from the various BITs.... [A]
host state which has not specifically agreed thereto can be confronted with a large
number of permutations of dispute settlement provisions from the various BITs which it
has concluded. Such a chaotic situation-actually counterproductive to harmonization-
cannot be the presumed intent of Contracting Parties.
244
Such difficulties, it seems, will indeed arise if claimants are allowed to mix
and match dispute settlement provisions as would be allowed under Siemens.
If claimants are allowed to borrow a filing deadline from one treaty, an
evidentiary rule from another, and a statute of limitations from a third, the
result will be chaotic and unworkable. Such difficulties could be mitigated,
however, by application of the jurisdictional requirement of consent, as well
as the requirement that the entire dispute settlement mechanism be
imported. This would generally preclude forum shopping as well as the
disruptive "provision shopping" of concern to the Tribunal in Plama, but it
would allow claimants such as Maffezini and Siemens to benefit from more
favorable provisions concerning the terms of access to or treatment within a
given arbitral forum.
The Tribunal was also critical of Maffezini's reference to public policy
considerations as exceptions to the broad application of MFN clauses to
dispute settlement provisions:
The present Tribunal was puzzled as to what the origin of these
"public policy considerations" is. When asked by the Tribunal at the Hearing, counsel for
the Claimant responded: "They just made it up." The present Tribunal does not wish to
go that far in its appraisal of the Maffezini decision. Rather, it seems that the effect of the
"public policy considerations" is that they take away much of the breadth of the
preceding observations made by the tribunal in Maffezini.24
On this last point, the Tribunal referred to Siemens in still more scathing
terms, as "illustrat[ing] the danger caused by the manner in which the
Maffezini decision has approached the question: the principle is retained in
the form of a string citation of principle and the exceptions are relegated to a
brief examination, prone to falling soon into oblivion.'
247
One might counter the Tribunal with a query as to the origin of its own
alternative "principle" that "an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not
incorporate by reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set
forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no
,,248
doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them. One group
of commentators has cautioned that:
244. Id. para. 219, at 775, discussing Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision
on Jurisdiction, para. 62, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 406 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/emilio_.DecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
245. This is also consistent with what the Plama tribunal referred to as "the nowadays
generally accepted principle of the separability (autonomy) of the arbitration clause." Plama Consortium
v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 212, 44 I.L.M. 721, 754
(2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-decision.pdf.
246. Id. para. 221, at 755 (citation omitted).
247. Id. para. 226, at 755 (citing Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8,
Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 105, 109, 120 (2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/siemens-
decision-en.pdf).
248. Id. para. 223, at 755.
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The primary aim of a process of interpretation ... [is to] discover the shared expectations
that the parties to the relevant communication succeeded in creating in each other .... [l]t
would be an obvious travesty on interpretation for a community decision-maker to
disregard the shared subjectivities of the parties and to substitute arbitrary assumptions of
his own. 249
While it would be unfair to characterize the assumptions of the Tribunal in
Plama as arbitrary, they are nevertheless rooted much more in the arbitrators'
pragmatic concerns than in an attempt to discern the parties' actual intent as
embodied in the words they used.
Finally, in an attempt at magnanimity toward the Tribunal in Maffezini,
which it had criticized so vehemently, the Tribunal in Plama acknowledged
that:
[T]he decision in Maffezini is perhaps understandable. The case concerned a curious
requirement that during the first 18 months the dispute be tried in the local courts. The
present Tribunal sympathizes with a tribunal that attempts to neutralize such a provision
that is nonsensical from a practical point of view. However, such exceptional
circumstances should not be treated as a statement of general principle guiding future
tribunals in other cases where exceptional circumstances are not present.
250
The Tribunal is surely correct that exceptional circumstances should not guide
the formulation of general principles to guide future tribunals. It is certainly
arguable, however, whether the waiting period at issue in Maffezini is more or
less "exceptional" than the very limited dispute settlement provisions at issue
in Plama. The Tribunal in Plama would have done better to heed its own
advice and, rather than seeking to announce a general principle, to rest its
decision on the narrower ground that Bulgaria had not consented to ICSID
jurisdiction over disputes concerning the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT.
It is worth noting that two subsequent arbitral tribunals have addressed MFN
clauses similar to the one at issue in Plama, and both have come to the same
result. In an unpublished award of April 2006 a tribunal of the Stockholm
Arbitration Institute rejected, by a majority of 2 to 1, a claim by Belgian
investors who sought to use the MFN clause to expand the scope of Russia's
consent to jurisdiction in a Soviet-era treaty similar to that at issue in Plama.
Similarly, in the just published award in Telenor v. Republic of Hungary, 251 an
ICSID tribunal considering a dispute under a BIT between Norway and
Hungary which limited access to arbitration to expropriation cases stated that
it "wholeheartedly endorse[d] the analysis and statement of principle
furnished by the Plama tribunal." 252 Nevertheless, the Telenor tribunal
understood Plama as standing for a narrower principle than the one in fact
announced in Plama and thus its endorsement of Plama is limited to the
principle expressed in Telenor that:
249. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE xvi-xvii (1967).
250. Plama, para. 224, 44 I.L.M. at 755.
251. See Telenor Mobile Communications v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Decision




an MFN clause in a BIT providing for most favoured nation treatment of investment
should not be construed as extending the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to categories
of dispute beyond those set out in the BIT itself in the absence of clear language that this
is the intention of the parties.
25 3
This formulation accounts for the outcomes in both Plama and Salini, but
without the potentially mischievous consequences of the more sweeping
principle advocated in Plama. Furthermore, this principle is not inconsistent
with the decisions in the Maffezini line of cases.
Properly understood, therefore, these decisions lend further support to the
notion that the decisive issue in Plama was not whether an MFN clause could
apply to dispute settlement provisions, but rather whether it could substitute
for-or expand the scope of-a host country's consent to jurisdiction.
H. Cases After Maffezini and Siemens Involving Argentina's 18-
Month Domestic Litigation Waiting Period2
54
A number of decisions since Siemens have addressed the question of
whether an MFN clause entitled a claimant to circumvent the eighteen-month
domestic litigation period formerly favored by Argentina. In each case, the
outcome was the same as in Maffezini. For the most part, these decisions do
little more than confirm that the Tribunal in Maffezini was correct in its
central holding. Nevertheless, some aspects of the decisions merit closer
inspection.
1. Camuzzi v. Argentina
The Camuzzi decision was the first of these cases to be released, and it is
noteworthy primarily for the fact that Argentina did not even bother to contest
the Claimant's reliance on the MFN clause to avoid the domestic litigation
255waiting period. Consequently, the Tribunal had little to say on the MFNissue.
2. Gas Natural v. Argentina
The dispute in Gas Natural was a mirror image of Maffezini in that it
involved a Spanish investor in Argentina invoking the MFN clause of the
Spain-Argentina BIT and a third-party BIT. That the outcome was the same is
not surprising, but the Tribunal's statement on the MFN issue in Gas Natural
provides perhaps the strongest affirmation yet of the notion that access to
arbitration constitutes an important substantive protection for investors. As the
253. Id. at 91.
254. See Camuzzi Int'l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, June
10, 2005, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/camuzzi-en.pdf; Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, June 17, 2005,
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf, Suez, et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, May 16, 2006, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/
ARB0317_DecisiononJurisdiction03-17.pdf, In re National Grid v. Argentina, UNCITRAL Arbitration,
Decision on Jurisdiction, June 20, 2006, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NationalGrid-Jurisdiction-
En.pdf.
255. Camuzzi, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/7, para. 17.
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Tribunal put it, "the critical issue is whether or not the dispute settlement
provisions of bilateral investment treaties constitute part of the bundle of
protections granted to foreign investors by host states. 256 The Tribunal
resolved this issue by unambiguously asserting that "such provisions are
universally regarded - by opponents as well as by proponents - as essential to
a regime of protection of foreign direct investment."' 257 The Tribunal then
went a step further and, after reviewing the decisions in Maffezini, Siemens,
and Salini, 58 concluded the following:
[A]ssurance of independent international arbitration is an important - perhaps the most
important - element in investor protection. Unless it appears clearly that the state parties
to a BIT or the parties to a particular investment agreement [as in Salini] settled on a
different method for resolution of disputes that may arise, most-favored-nation provisions
in BITs should be understood to be applicable to dispute settlement.
2 5 9
As this Article has argued, such blanket statements must be viewed with
caution. Maffezini, Siemens, Gas Natural, and Camuzzi all involved the same
question, i.e., whether or not a domestic litigation waiting period not
amounting to a requirement to exhaust domestic remedies could be avoided
through an MFN clause and a third-party treaty not including such a
requirement. As Gaillard has argued, this narrow question has now been
definitively resolved. 260 However, it does not necessarily follow that these
cases can be read for the broader proposition advanced by the Tribunal here,
particularly in light of the contrary result in Salini and especially in light of
the strong advocacy of the exact opposite point of view by the Tribunal in
Plama at approximately the same time.
3. National Grid v. Argentina
The UNCITRAL tribunal in National Grid also followed an approach
similar to that advocated in this Article, in that it engaged in an extensive
review of previous I.C.J. and ICSID cases, and went on to couch its decision
in appropriately narrow terms:
[I]n the context in which the Respondent has consented to arbitration for the resolution of
the type of disputes raised by the Claimant, 'treatment' under the MFN clause of the
Treaty makes it possible for UK investors in Argentina to resort to arbitration without
first resorting to Argentine courts, as is permitted under the US-Argentina Treaty.
26
1
The wording of this conclusion reflected the distinction the Tribunal drew
between the circumstances in National Grid and those in Plama. The Tribunal
correctly noted that "the situation in Plama involv[ed] an attempt to create
consent to ICSID arbitration when none existed. ,,262 The Tribunal thus
256. Gas Natural, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, para. 29.
257. Id.
258. Id. paras. 41-49.
259. Id. para. 49.
260. Emmanuel Gaillard, Chronique des sentences arbitrales, 133 JOURNAL DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 221, 285 (2006) [hereinafter Gaillard 2006].
261. In re National Grid v. Argentina, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Decision on Jurisdiction, para.
93, June 20, 2006, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NationalGrid-Jurisdiction-En.pdf.
262. Id. para. 92.
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accepted the outcome in Plama, but rejected Plama's advocacy of a narrowing
construction of MFN clauses, because "cases like Plama do not justify
depriving the MFN clause of its legitimate meaning or purpose in a particular
case."
263
4. Suez et al. v. Argentina
The Suez decision is noteworthy not because of the outcome, which is
identical to that reached in all of the other cases, but because of the process by
which the Tribunal reached that outcome. The Tribunal rejected the notion
that any broad principle or presumption should govern the applicability of
MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions and instead argued that each
case must be decided on its own terms by way of an ordinary process of treaty
interpretation.
First, the Tribunal rejected an argument based on the ejusdem generis
principle, noting that:
[A]fter an analysis of the substantive provisions of the BITs in question, the Tribunal
finds no basis for distinguishing dispute settlement matters from any other matters
covered by a bilateral investment treaty. From the point of view of the promotion and
protection of investments, the stated purposes of the Argentina-Spain BIT, dispute
settlement is as important as other matters governed by the BIT and is an integral part of
the investment protection regime that two sovereign states .... 264
In other words, the Tribunal did not consider that dispute settlement
provisions should be treated differently than other treaty provisions for MFN
purposes.
Next, the Tribunal specifically rejected Argentina's argument that MFN
clauses should be construed narrowly with respect to dispute settlement
provisions:
[T]he Respondent seems to argue that the Tribunal should interpret a most-favored-nation
provision strictly. Here too, the Tribunal finds no rule and no reason for interpreting the
most-favored-nation treatment clause any differently from any other clause in the
Argentina-Spain BIT. The language of the treaty is clear. Applying the normal
interpretational methodology to Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT, the Tribunal finds
that the ordinary meaning of that provision is that matters relating to dispute settlement
are included within the term "all matters" .... 265
The Tribunal went on to distinguish the Suez case from Plama on
several grounds, including the narrow scope of the MFN clause in Plama, the
apparent intention of communist Bulgaria to limit access to arbitration, and
the fact that a contrary decision in Plama would have had the "radical effect"
of substituting an entirely different dispute settlement mechanism (i.e. ICSID
arbitration instead of arbitration under UNCITRAL rules).266
263. Id.
264. Suez et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 57, May 16, 2006, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/
ARB0317_DecisiononJurisdiction03-17.pdf.
265. Id. para. 59.
266. Id. para. 63.
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Moreover, the Suez Tribunal specifically rejected the Plama Tribunal's
insistence that an intent to incorporate dispute settlement provisions within the
scope of an MFN clause must be clearly expressed. Instead, the Tribunal
affirmed that "dispute resolution provisions are subject to interpretation like
any other provisions of a treaty, neither more restrictive nor more liberal."267
The Tribunal in Suez is thus the first tribunal to explicitly follow the
approach to MFN issues advocated in this article, and, in the author's view,
represents a model for future tribunals to follow. The Tribunal correctly notes
that there is no justification for a tribunal to impose a rebuttable presumption
in favor of applicability or non-applicability of MFN clauses to dispute
settlement provisions as advocated by the tribunals in Plama and Gas Natural.
Instead, as this Article has stressed, tribunals should approach MFN issues as
matters of treaty interpretation in which a tribunal's task is to interpret the text
in light of the specific context and the purposes of the parties in agreeing to
the treaty as a whole and the MFN clause in particular. There is little to be
gained-and a potential for results that are inconsistent with the parties'
intentions-in the application of a presumption in either direction.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Reconciling Policy and Purposes with Practice
These decisions illustrate the numerous difficulties of applying MFN
clauses to dispute settlement provisions in practice. While these practical
concerns do not put in question the general interpretive position outlined in
Part III, they do place limits on how and when dispute settlement provisions
can be invoked through an MFN clause, and these limits should do much to
alleviate the concerns that have been raised about the Maffezini and Siemens
decisions. Unless the BIT limits the scope of the MFN clause, the pledge of
equal treatment in an MFN clause applies broadly to all aspects of the legal
regime applicable to foreign investors, including the dispute settlement
mechanism. Such application is more consistent with the aim of establishing
an environment for foreign investment that is marked by mutual confidence,
stability of expectations, and equality among investors. However, the MFN
clause cannot be applied in a way that would violate basic principles of
international law, impose results that could not have been intended by the
parties, or otherwise disrupt the predictability and stability of the international
investment law system.
On the practical level, it is worth distinguishing four different types of
MFN provisions:
1. MFN clauses that expressly provide that they apply to dispute settlement
mechanisms (e.g., U.K. Model BIT);
2. Broadly worded MFN clauses covering 'all matters,' 'all rights,' or
simply 'treatment,' which make no specific reference to dispute
settlement mechanisms (e.g., Maffezini, Plama, Salini, Siemens);
267. Id. para. 64.
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
3. Limited MFN clauses that do not expressly include dispute settlement
mechanisms (e.g., NAFTA); and
4. MFN clauses that expressly do not apply to dispute settlement
provisions (e.g., CAFTA, FTAA).
The first and fourth categories are unproblematic: The clearly expressed intent
of the parties must be respected. The third category, meanwhile, is not
susceptible to much by way of general analysis, since all will depend on an
interpretation of the specific wording of the clause in the context of a specific
BIT. The most frequent formulation of this version of the clause, however,
modeled on NAFTA Article 1103, would seem to preclude its application to
dispute settlement. 268 As the cases discussed above illustrate, the most
difficult disputes will arise concerning clauses falling in the second category.
What follows are some considerations that may help future tribunals to find
their way out of the thicket into which the recent decisions have led.
B. Specific Recommendations
1. An MFN Clause Cannot Substitute for Actual Consent
The I.C.J. has stated that "an important principle of customary
international law should [not] be held to have been tacitly dispensed, in the
absence of any words making clear an intention to do so." 2 69 The principle
that an international tribunal lacks jurisdiction absent the parties' consent is
just such a principle, and as the Permanent Court held in the Chorzow Factory
Case, consent must be affirmatively established by a preponderance of
evidence. 270 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention requires that "the parties271
to the dispute consent in writing to submit [the dispute] to the Centre, and
as the Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention put it, "Consent of
the parties is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre." 272 Against this
backdrop, and in light of the vigorous debate over whether MFN clauses apply
to dispute settlement provisions at all, it would be difficult-if not
impossible-to establish a preponderance of evidence in favor of jurisdiction
on the basis of an MFN clause combined with consent with regards to a third
party.
273
From the perspective of a tribunal, therefore, the host state's consent to
its jurisdiction must be established as a threshold matter. A state's consent is
both forum-specific and party-specific, so that consent to arbitration under
UNCITRAL rules does not constitute consent to ICSID arbitration, nor does
consent to ICSID arbitration of disputes with Finnish nationals constitute
268. See supra notes 8, 95 and accompanying text.
269. Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42 (July 20).
270. See Chorz6w Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), Jurisdiction, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 3, at 32,
available at http://www.worldcounts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/I 927.07.26/chorzow/.
271. ICSID, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES
AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, reprinted in CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, 7, 18 (2003).
272. ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 54, at 43, para. 23.
273. For an opposing view, see Gaillard 2006, supra note 260, at 286-87 (arguing that when a
state consents to arbitration with one state's nationals, it is presumed to be aware of its previous
engagements to grant MFN treatment to nationals of other states and therefore has implicitly consented
to arbitration with those third state nationals).
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consent to arbitration with nationals of Cyprus. In order to cross the consent
threshold, a claimant must establish a consensual link among (1) the host
state, (2) the investor's home state, (3) the forum, and (4) the specific dispute.
The claimants in Salini, Plama, and Telenor would all have foundered at this
stage of the inquiry, whereas the claimants in Maffezini and Siemens would
have succeeded.
It may well be argued that applying this threshold test weakens the MFN
clause by allowing for a situation to exist in which one state's nationals enjoy
more favorable dispute settlement provisions than those of another state. The
problem is a real one, but it cannot be remedied through the inappropriate
exercise of jurisdiction by arbitral tribunals. As President McNair emphasized
in his separate opinion in Anglo-Iranian Oil, the fact that U.K. nationals were
entitled by virtue of their MFN clause to the same treatment as Danish
nationals did not confer upon the Court the power to enforce that right.274 The
same result was reached in Plama and Telenor.
A more difficult question arises when a claimant seeks to expand the
scope of the host state's consent to arbitration through an MFN clause. Even
BITs envisioning arbitration in the same forum (e.g., ICSID) may be
materially different in terms of their scope. As Salini illustrated, contractual
claims were included within the scope of Jordan's consent for some countries'
investors but excluded for others. Since the exclusion of contract claims from
the Italy-Jordan BIT was explicit in Salini, it was a simple matter for the
Tribunal to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction over the Italian claimant's
contract claims. In other cases, the BITs in question may have broader or
narrower definitions of "investment," or they may differ in whether they apply
to "pre-entry" activities of the investor. In such cases, or others where the
parties' intent is less clear from the text than in Salini, respect for the principle
that jurisdiction depends on consent requires that the scope of consent be
determined with reference to the basic treaty. This is another way of reading
the Plama case: Not only did Bulgaria never consent to the jurisdiction of
ICSID over disputes with Cypriot investors, but its consent to (ad hoc)
arbitration was limited in scope to the amount of compensation due for an
expropriation and therefore did not extend to the merits of an investment
dispute.
2. Where Consent Exists, Ordinary Rules of Treaty
Interpretation Apply
When all these elements are present, it becomes a matter of treaty
interpretation whether an MFN clause applies to the other aspects of the
dispute settlement mechanism, such as the waiting period at issue in Maffezini
and Siemens. As discussed in Part III, it would seem that giving to an
unlimited MFN clause (e.g., Category 2) will usually require allowing dispute
settlement provisions to be imported from a third-party treaty. After all, as
Gaillard has argued, access to arbitration is one of the principal benefits that
274. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 122
(July 22) (McNair, Pres., concurring).
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such treaties provide to investors, so the choice of a broad MFN clause
implies an intent by the parties to accord this benefit to all investors on equal
275terms. However, as the Tribunal in Plama warned, one must be "mindful of
Sir Ian Sinclair's warning of the 'risk that the placing of undue emphasis on
the "object and purpose" of a treaty will encourage teleological methods of
interpretation [which], in some of its more extreme forms, will even deny the
relevance of the intentions of the parties."'
276
There is therefore no substitute for a case-by-case basis interpretation of
the specific BIT provisions in question. There may well be many cases in
which careful scrutiny of the text, context, negotiating history, or other
considerations will persuade a tribunal that the parties' intent was that the
MFN clause should not apply to dispute settlement provisions.277 In other
cases, as in Salini and Plama, examination of the BIT will call into question
the state's consent to jurisdiction. This is also arguably the case of all four of
the "public policy" exceptions identified in Maffezini.
3. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Are a Package and Cannot
Be Mixed and Matched
As the discussion of the Siemens case illustrated, allowing investors to
mix and match dispute settlement provisions may require states to apply
configurations of dispute settlement provisions to which they have never
actually consented. Requiring that dispute settlement provisions be imported
as a package or not at all better fulfils the aim of maintaining a stable and
predictable legal environment for investments as well as the aim of ensuring
equality of treatment for investors of whatever nationality. As in the Siemens
example, an MFN clause should entitle German investors to the same
treatment as Chilean investors, but it ought not to entitle Germans to better
treatment than provided in the Chile-Argentina BIT, nor ought it to entitle the
Chileans and Germans to fuse their treaties to extract an even more favorable
treatment from Argentina. To be sure, there may be difficult questions as to
which provisions constitute part of the "package" which must be taken
together or not at all, but such difficulties appear relatively minor relative to
the problems associated with unrestrained, provision-by-provision treaty
shopping.
To be sure, allowing the import of the entire package of dispute
settlement provisions does allow for some treaty shopping, but this form of
treaty shopping-as opposed to provision shopping-already exists to a large
275. See Gaillard 2005, supra note 63, at 163 ("Lorsque la clause est r~dig~e en des termes tris
grnrraux, tout laisse A penser que l'intention des rrdacteurs du trait6 6tait bien de lui permettre de jouer
A 'gard de tous les brnrfices que l'Etat d'accueil serait susceptible d'accorder aux ressortissants
d'Etats tiers. Or force est de constater que l'accis A un mrcanisme efficace et neutre de rrglemcnt des
diffrrends . . . est bien l'un des brnrfices les plus importants, sinon le plus important, susceptible de
rrsulter du droit contemporain de la protection des investissements.").
276. Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 193, 44 I.L.M. 721, 751 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/plama-
decision.pdf (quoting IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 13 (2d ed.
1984)).
277. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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extent as a result of the globalization of investment activities. An investor
wishing to take advantage of the most favorable dispute settlement provisions
could simply have the case brought by an affiliate or entity within the
corporate chain that is based in the appropriate country, or, absent such an
entity, incorporate an investment vehicle for the purpose of assuming the most
favorable nationality. 279 Since the treaty shopping would be limited to the
selection of an entire BIT or an entire dispute settlement mechanism rather
than the selection of individual provisions, it does not create the sort of
disruption that both the Maffezini and Plama tribunals feared. In addition,
treating dispute settlement provisions as a package will better serve the
secondary function of MFN clauses in contributing to the harmonization of
the law of international investment protection. 280 As the Tribunal in Plama
correctly pointed out, the pick-and-choose solution adopted in Maffezini is
particularly ill-suited to this goal.281
4. Claimants Must Show Treatment To Be Different and "More
Favorable "
The MFN principle can be described alternatively as a requirement of
equality of treatment or as one of non-discrimination. In most cases, there is
no difference between the two norms, since differential treatment will
necessarily disadvantage one party, hence the nearly universal rejection of the
notion "separate but equal." As with any treaty provision, however, MFN
clauses must be understood first in terms of the words actually used. The most
common formulation requires "treatment not less favorable" than that
accorded to a third party. This wording places the burden on a claimant to
show that the third-party treatment is, in fact, more favorable.
As a first step, the claimant must show that the treatment under the two
BITs is different. While the Tribunal in Asian Agricultural Products stated as
the basis of its decision on the MFN issue that the claimant had "not proven
that the Sri Lanka/Switzerland Treaty contains rules more favorable than those
provided for under the Sri Lanka/U.K. Treaty,' 282 the point of the Tribunal's
278. See UNCTAD, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, supra note 2, at 10-11 (noting that "with
the emergence of new forms of integrated production, and with management and decision-making
possibly spread among several parts of a corporation, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the
nationality of the parent company .... Furthermore, if the units are incorporated and administered in
different countries, especially if they are owned by shareholders of different nationalities or linked to
one another by contractual arrangements, it may become difficult in practice to attribute nationality to a
particular affiliate").
279. This may seem far-fetched, but the nationality of investors has proven slippery indeed. For
example, in Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2004 WL
3392064 (2004), an ICSID tribunal upheld jurisdiction based on the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT for a
corporation incorporated in Lithuania but owned and managed almost entirely by Ukrainian nationals.
280. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 62, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 396, 410 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf; see also Gaillard 2005, supra note 63, at 158 (noting the "double
function" of MFN clauses in ensuring nondiscrimination and contributing to the harmonization of
international investment law).
281. Plama, para. 219,44 I.L.M. at 755.
282. Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3 30, para. 54, 30,
I.L.M. 580, 603 (1991).
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analysis was that the claimant had failed to show that the Swiss treaty
contained a different rule than the U.K. treaty.
If the provisions are in fact different, the claimant must show that it
would suffer some disadvantage by not being able to invoke the provisions of
the third-party treaty. It might be argued that a host state is presumed to be
aware of its own MFN commitments and that when it agrees to certain
provisions in a BIT, it agrees to apply those provisions to investors from any
other state as well. According to this view, therefore, it should be enough to
show that the provisions are different. However, the terms of the typical MFN
clause and the overall aims of stability and predictability argue against
allowing provisions to be imported that do not result in treatment that is
objectively more favorable. Thus if one treaty provides for arbitration to take
place in Geneva and another in London, this is not the sort of difference that
would appear to disadvantage one party or the other. In contrast, exempting
some investors but not others from an eighteen-month domestic litigation
waiting period suggests a number of possible disadvantages. 283 In either case,
however, the burden is on the claimant to show that the treatment sought is, in
fact, more favorable.
28 4
5. Parties Should Express the Intended Scope of Their MFN
Clauses As Clearly As Possible
The disputes over MFN in recent case law stem from the fact that the
BITs in question did not evince any intent on the part of the contracting
parties as to whether the MFN clause applied to dispute settlement. The
simplest solution to this problem is for governments negotiating BITs to make
their intentions known. While the issue may simply not have occurred to the
parties negotiating BITs in the past, these decisions have placed states on
notice that they ignore the question at their peril. This Article has suggested
that where the MFN clause does not contain any limits it will be interpreted as
applying broadly, including to dispute settlement mechanisms. As Vattel
cautions, "If he who could and ought to have explained himself clearly and
fully has not done it, it is the worse for him; he cannot be allowed to introduce
subsequent restrictions which he has not expressed." 2" The FTAA
negotiations, discussed in Plama, illustrate that some states have drawn
lessons from these cases for future practice.2 86 It remains to be seen whether
other countries will follow suit.
287
283. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
284. The essence of the burden on the claimant is to show that a third-party investor in like
circumstances would enjoy treatment that is different and objectively more favorable. In practice, this
MFN analysis may require an intensive examination of the facts in order to determine, for example,
whether the claimant is in fact similarly situated to a real or hypothetical third-party investor.
285. VATrEL, supra note 68, § 264.2d at 244 (emphasis omitted).
286. See supra note 2344 and accompanying text.
287. Argentina, the country most intimately involved in the recent arbitrations, recently ratified
a BIT with Panama that contained an MFN clause identical to the one at issue in Siemens. See Convenio
Para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de las Inversiones [Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Reciprocal Investments], Arg.-Pan., May 10, 1996, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/
iia/docs/bits/argentina panama-sp.pdf (entered into force Sept. 15, 2004).
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